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Abstract
Optimised Active Fault Detection for an Open Loop
Stable System
R. Busch
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Dissertation: PhD
November 2016
Active fault detection for a stable open-loop linear time invariant system is
considered. The optimal active fault detection setup is developed around an
estimator based architecture. The auxiliary signal and estimator are then
designed in order to maximize detection performance.
Equations are derived which relate the estimator design to the nominal
residual signal covariance. The relationship between the auxiliary input and
the system performance degradation constraint is considered. The effect of es-
timator gain and excitation signal frequency on the dual Youla-Jabr-Bongiorno-
Kucera parameter is investigated.
An LTI input shaping filter is added to allow for added MIMO system
complexity. Theory developed for the general output zeroing problem is com-
bined with the extended MIMO architecture in order to arrive at a solution
without the nominal performance penalty usually associated with active fault
detection. Furthermore, the effect of the control input is considered and for-
mulated as an additional optimisation criterion, resulting in an average-case
optimisation scenario.
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ABSTRACT iii
The effect of the excitation signal frequency on detector performance is
investigated, and a minimum targeted detection time parameter is introduced.
This set of equations is then used to minimise the fault detection time for fixed
performance constraints and minimum targeted detection time.
A conceptual Active Fault Tolerant Control Framework is developed for a
small unmanned aerial vehicle, emphasising the role of fault detection. The
theoretical framework is then applied to this UAV, illustrating the applicability
of the proposed AFD framework to more complex practical problems.
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Uittreksel
Geoptimeerde Aktiewe Vout Deteksie vir n Ooplus
Stabiele Stelsel
(“Optimised Active Fault Detection for an Open Loop Stable System”)
R. Busch
Departement Elektries en Elektroniese Ingenieurswese,
Universiteit van Stellenbosch,
Privaatsak X1, Matieland 7602, Suid Afrika.
Proefskrif: PhD
November 2016
Aktiewe foutdeteksie vir ’n stabiele oop-lus liniere tyd-onafhanklike stelsel
word oorweeg. Die optimale aktiewe foutdeteksie stelsel word ontwerp rondom
’n beramer-gebaseerde argitektuur. Die hulpsein en beramer word dan ontwerp
om opsporingsvermoe te maksimeer.
Vergelykings wat die verband tussen die beramerontwerp en die nominale
residuele sein se kovariansie beskryf word afgelei. Die verhouding tussen die
hulpsein en die beperking op die stelsel se prestasie agteruitgang word oorweeg.
Die effek van beramer aanwins en die hulpsein frekwensie op die dubbel-Youla-
Jabr-Bongiorno-Kucera parameter word ondersoek.
’n Liniere tyd-onafhanklike insetvormende filter word bygevoeg om die ad-
disionele multi-inset multi-uitset kompleksietyd te hanteer. Teorie wat ontwik-
kel is vir die algemene uitset nulstellingsprobleem word gekombineer met die
uitgebreide multi-inset multi-uitset argitektuur om ’n oplossing to vind sonder
enige van die nominale stelselprestasie agteruitgang wat gewoonlik geassosi-
eer word met aktiewe foutdeteksie. Verder word die effek van die beheerinset
iv
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oorweeg, en geformuleer as ’n addisionele optimiseringskriterium, wat lei tot
gemiddelde-geval optimisering.
Die effek van die hulpsein frekwensie op die foutdeteksie prestasie word
ondersoek, en ’n minimum teiken opsporingsparameter word ingestel. Hierdie
stel vergelykings word dan gebruik om die foutdeteksie tyd vir vaste prestasie-
beperkings en minimale geteikende deteksie tyd so laag as moontlik te kry.
’n Konseptuele Aktiewe Foutverdraagsame Beheerraamwerk is ontwikkel
vir ’n klein onbemande lugvoertuig, wat die rol van foutdeteksie beklemtoon.
Die teoretiese raamwerk word dan tot hierdie onbemande lugvoertuig aange-
wend, om sodoende die toepaslikheid van die voorgestelde Aktiewe Foutdetek-
sie raamwerk op meer ingewikkelde praktiese probleme te illustreer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter begins by providing background information to the Active Fault
Detection research presented in the remainder of this thesis. A brief history to
the wider field of Fault Tolerant Control and more specifically Fault Detection
is provided. Next, a detailed motivation for implementing an Active Fault
Detection system is provided. The research presented here is then related to
previous research performed at Stellenbosch University. Finally, a brief thesis
outline is provided.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Definition
Active fault detection (AFD) is the technique of detecting anomalous changes
by means of injecting an external excitation signal into the system and then
monitoring the system’s response to this excitation signal.
1.1.2 History of Fault Tolerant Control and Fault
Detection
With the ever increasing levels of automation and control came ever increasing
demands on sophistication, performance, availability, and reliability of these
automated systems.
1
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One of the first research fields spawned by this search was adaptive con-
trol. The earliest adaptive controllers were the results of autopilot research in
the 1950s. The first Model Reference Adaptive Control (MRAC) designs were
based on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) rule, and later on
the optimal Linear Quadratic (LQ) solution [1]. However from the 1970s on-
wards a number of concerns were raised about the stability problems associated
with the adaptive control schemes of the time.
Around the same time the field of Robust Control started to produce practi-
cally applicable theory. With robust control, the control law remains fixed but
uncertainty is explicitly considered during the design phase. Robust control
was born from the failures and disappointments experienced when attempts
were made in the mid 1970s to apply Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) con-
trol to practical problems including submarines and aircraft[2]. Robust control
research has lead to a number of frequently used design tools and concepts such
as: Multi-variable stability margins; H2 synthesis; H∞ optimal synthesis; and
later H∞ loop shaping.
Both adaptive and robust control theory are attempts to deal with the
uncertainty problem but solves the problem using entirely different approaches.
Both these approaches have there own advantages and disadvantages, and from
the 1980s onwards attempts were made to combine the strengths of both into
what is known as Robust Adaptive Control [2] [3] [4].
Both Adaptive Control as well as Robust Control theory can be used to
develop so called Passive Fault Tolerant Control Systems (PFTC). This is
usually done by modelling system failures as parametric variations. These
PFTC systems do not employ fault detectors or online parameter estimation,
and they do not actively reconfigure the control law after a failure.
Research into Active Fault Tolerant Control (AFTC), and the subsystems
required to make it viable, was sparked by a number of air transport incidents
in the 1970s which made it clear that using the remaining actuators in an
unconventional manner could save the vehicle after a serious failure. It was
quickly realised that the limiting factor to the success of these AFTC systems
was fast and accurate fault detection [5] [6].
Not surprisingly, research into fault detection also started in the 1970s with
the development of observer based detectors. Later in the same decade, system
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identification based methods also started to appear. The parity-equation based
methods that are currently popular first appeared in the mid 1980s. Activity
started to gather pace in the early 1990s with the International Federation
of Automatic Control (IFAC) holding symposiums and later establishing a
technical committee for the rapidly progressing research field[7].
The first publications in the field of active fault detection started in the
late 1980s with the publication of research on auxiliary signal design by Zhang
[8] [9]. This was followed by more research on the design of auxiliary input
signals including the research published by Kerestecioglu [10] [11] in the early
1990s. Research in the field accelerated rapidly from the late 1990s onwards
with a number of significant publications including, numerous publications by
Nikoukhah and/or Campbell [12] [13] [14] [15] [16].
1.1.3 Motivation for Active Fault Detection
A key element of an AFTC system is a reliable and efficient fault detector.
Fault Detection Approaches can be subdivided into passive or active fault
detection. With passive fault detection the system response is simply mon-
itored, while for active fault detection additional stimuli are injected. Both
approaches come with their own advantages and disadvantages. However, the
primary reason for using active fault detection is that it provides the ability
to provide guarantees on the detection performance independently of control
inputs.
The main disadvantage of using active fault detection is the negative effect
this additional excitation has on the other system performance parameters,
while passive fault detection imposes no such penalty. This negative effect can
however be minimised to such a degree that it imposes a very small perfor-
mance penalty, and in some cases even completely eliminated.
1.1.4 Control and Systems Research at Stellenbosch
University
Extensive research has been conducted in the related fields of control and
general systems research at Stellenbosch University’s Electronic Systems Lab-
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oratory (ESL).
Most of the research conducted in the ESL since 2001 has emphasized
Aerospace applications, in particular Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which in-
clude both fixed and rotary wing vehicles [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]. Some of the
most notable research conducted has been on Manoeuvre Autopilot Design
and Application [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27].
From 2010 onwards the research performed started to focus more on Fault
Tolerant Control and related fields, in particular applied to Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles. Initially the research focused on system identification [28], post fail-
ure actuator reallocation [29], and standard adaptive control solutions [30].
Following this, research was performed on more complex asymmetric failure
cases [31], online system identification [32], and a comparison of available fault
detection methods applicable to actuator failures [33].
1.2 Literature Review
Classifying fault detection systems into exact groupings is often a difficult
task as different aspects of the fault detection system may be classified into
different groups. According to a review paper by Zhang and Jiang [34] fault
detection systems may be classified by using a number of different metrics,
these include: Model vs Data based; Qualitative vs Quantitative; by residual
generation technique; and by residual evaluation technique. A similar grouping
is also proposed in an extensive review paper by Venkatasubramanian et al.[35]
[36] [37]. Each of these groupings can again be subdivided into a number of
subgroups. In addition to the groupings proposed in [34] and [35] [36] [37] it
is also useful to group the schemes based on the type of excitation used, i.e
passive vs active excitation. This distinction provides many of the basic axioms
underlying the research to follow, and therefore will form the basic viewpoint
of this review. Below follows a summary of the various fault detection schemes,
based on the groupings suggested in [35].
• Quantitative Model-Based: In a quantitative model a priori knowl-
edge is usually expressed in terms of input-output relations. These mod-
els closely resemble the well known classical and modern control models.
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The quantitative model based methods exploit some form of analytical
redundancy, and can be grouped as follows:
– Observers or Estimators: Observers or Estimators may be used
to estimate the plant output. This estimate is then compared to the
measured output generating a residual signal from a mismatch. A
form of feedback is usually employed to provide robustness against
mismatched initial conditions, model uncertainties, as well as noise
sources.
– Parity Space: Parity Equations are derived from modified input-
output relations. These parity relations are designed to be theoret-
ically zero in the fault-free case, while resulting in non-zero residual
in the faulty case. In practice, however, the residuals will never be
zero due to modelling errors, as well as various noise sources.
• Qualitative Model-Based: Qualitative models are more conceptual
in nature, and describe the available a priori knowledge in more abstract
terms. Popular qualitative model-based schemes may be grouped as
follows:
– Signed Digraphs: Signed Digraphs are directional cause-effect
relations which can be used to describe the possible faults in a
system. This qualitative modelling technique has been most widely
used in the field of process control.
– Qualitative Simulations: QSIM models are derived by approxi-
mating the physical model. These models are often highly inaccu-
rate and may contain only partial information. This method has
proved popular in the process control filed.
• Knowledge- or History-Based: No explicit models are available. The
available a priori knowledge is in the form of large amounts of historical
data. Popular knowledge-based schemes may be grouped as follows:
– Expert Systems: Expert systems attempt to duplicate the meth-
ods used by a expert human operator in detecting and analysing
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fault conditions. These systems are popular due to their well de-
fined behaviour and relatively simple implementation.
– Principal Component Analysis: PCA and other statistical ex-
traction methods are widely applied to complex process control
problems. These methods monitor a few key statistical metrics,
providing a overview of the system’s health.
– Neural Networks: Artificial Neural Networks are used as build-
ing blocks for a self learning system. A lot of interest has been
shown in applying these networks to the fault detection problem.
A major problem with these systems is the difficultly in providing
deterministic performance guarantees.
A categorised summary of some of the most notable and relevant contribu-
tions to the field of fault detection is shown in Table 1.1.
With reference to Table 1.1 it can be seen that numerous approaches have
been attempted to perform fault detection. However, for the research pre-
sented here, the actively excited quantitative model-based are the most rele-
vant. Therefore, these methods are now discussed in more detail.
When compared to the classic quantitative model-based passive fault de-
tection methods, relatively few papers have been published on active fault
detection. Some research has been published augmenting the well known In-
teracting Multiple-Model (IMM) based methods using active excitation[51]. Of
the most notable publications on the topic are those by Niemann and Poulsen
[54][55][56][57] based on the dual Youla-Bongiorno-Jabr-Kucera (YBGK) parametri-
sation [69][70][71]. In [54][55] Niemann considers Active Fault Diagnosis in
open loop and closed loop systems based on the YBGK parametrisation. In
[56] the previous research is expanded by giving some consideration to auxil-
iary signal design. These ideas are further extended by Niemann and Poulsen
in [57] by focusing on the isolation and diagnosis of faults from stochastic sig-
nals using Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) tests. Of less relevance to the research
presented here, but by no means less notable, are numerous works published by
Campbell, Nikoukhah, et el. These include a number of publications on active
failure detection, with a specific focus on auxiliary signal design [14][15][72].
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Passive Fault Detection Active Fault Detection
Quantitative
Model-Based
General Observer Based
Fault Detection [38] [39].
IMM based methods, in-
cluding research presented
in [40] [41] [42].
Parity Relation based Fault
Detection methods, includ-
ing [43] [44] [45].
LMI based methods, includ-
ing the research presented
in [46] [47].
Fault Detection Using Slid-
ing Mode Observers [48] [49]
[50].
General Observer Based
Fault Detection with active
excitation [14] [16].
Active IMM based meth-
ods, including research pre-
sented in [51] [52] [53].
Actively excited YBJK
parametrization based,
including research by Nie-
mann and Poulsen [54] [55]
[56] [57].
Qualitative
Model-Based
SDG based methods, including [58] [59].
Qualitative simulation based fault diagnosis methods,
including research presented in [60] [61].
Knowledge or
History Bases
Expert System Based Fault Detection, including the
frameworks and systems presented in [62] [63] [64].
Neural-Network Based Schemes, such as the research
presented in [65] [66].
PCA based fault detection methods, including research
presented in [67] [68].
Table 1.1: Basic Approaches in fault detection grouped according to the type
of model and excitation used
1.2.1 Novelty of Approach
For the research presented in this dissertation it is considered that an esti-
mator can be designed for the sole purpose of fault-detection. This allows the
estimator to be optimised for AFD instead of being fixed due to control system
requirements.
In order to simplify the AFD system the focus is initially shifted to the
open-loop case, which leads to significant simplifications of the optimal AFD
solution. Considering the AFD system in the open loop case ensures that
the solution is not skewed by the controller dynamics. Considering the more
complex problem from the start increases the risk that a major problem may
be missed. Additionally, it is shown that the effect of closing a control loop
around the system can be quantified and is often of little consequence. Exten-
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sion and considerations for the closed loop case will be the subject of further
research. Furthermore, it is shown that, by employing these simplified open-
loop equations, a simple optimal observer based AFD system can be realised.
With the extra degree of freedom this provides, the optimising equation
of [54] yields a trivial solution unless augmented with a final constraint that
captures the detector dynamics. The theory is therefore extended in order to
take the dynamics of the detector into consideration by analysing the effect
of the excitation signal on the detector performance. To quantify this effect
a parameter called the minimum targeted detection time is introduced. This
parameter is related to the detector dynamics, and places a lower limit on
the excitation signal frequency, thereby allowing a non-trivial optimal AFD
solution to be obtained.
The theory developed is extended to take advantage of certain Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) system properties, making it possible to ex-
cite the fault dynamics without introducing additional disturbances into the
nominal system as is always the case in for Single Input Single Output (SISO)
systems. A zero disturbance AFD system based around the general output
zeroing problem [73] is developed.
The resulting optimisation framework employs relatively simple to apply
frequency domain optimisation techniques. Furthermore , the fault detection
system requires relatively few run-time resources as it primarily consists of a
linear estimator and a bi-directional cumulative sum detector.
1.3 Thesis Overview
Earlier in chapter 1 the theoretical background required for the active fault
detection problem and related research is introduced in the form of a detailed
literature review.
In Part 1 the active fault detection problem is introduced. Next, the the-
oretical AFD framework developed. This framework is then used to arrive at
an optimal estimator based AFD solution for both MIMO as well as simplified
SISO systems.
In Part 2 the theoretical research presented in Part 1 is applied to a number
of illustrative SISO and MIMO examples of increasing complexity.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9
In Part 3 the optimal AFD problem is applied to a larger Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV)-centric case study. This case study illustrates the effectiveness
of applying the optimal AFD solution to practical problems.
Finally, in Part 4 a conclusion is provided, and possible future research
efforts discussed.
Introduction Literature Review  
Theoretical 
Development
Illustrative 
Examples 
Case StudyConclusion
Figure 1.1: Thesis overview.
1.3.1 Theoretical Development
Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical framework development and optimisation
problem. The chapter starts by describing the basic AFD framework and
associated theory. Next, in Chapter 3 the full MIMO AFD optimisation is
derived. This includes the Standard as well as Zero Disturbance AFD cases.
In Chapter 4 this optimisation problem is then considered for SISO systems
leading to substantial simplifications. Finally, in Chapter 5 the developed
framework is summarised and discussed.
Framework 
Development
The
General Case
The Simplified 
SISO Case
Figure 1.2: Theoretical development overview.
1.3.2 Practical Application
Chapter 6 and 7 deals with the application of the theoretical framework de-
veloped in part 1. Chapter 6 starts by considering basic SISO applications.
This is then followed by more complex MIMO examples. Chapter 7 provides
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background to the application of fault detection for UAVs and then applies the
framework to a larger, more practical UAV example.
Basic SISO 
Examples 
Basic MIMO 
Examples
Case Study
Figure 1.3: Illustrative examples and practical application overview.
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Theoretical Development
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Chapter 2
An Architecture for Active
Fault Detection
In this chapter, the system setup used for Active Fault Detection is derived.
During this process, a number of key aspects are addressed. Amongst these
core aspects are:
• The introduction of an auxiliary fault detection signal into the system,
while minimizing the negative effects of this additional excitation signal;
• The generation of a residual signal, to be used for the purpose of fault
detection;
• The development of a fault detector which interprets the residual signal
for the purpose of fault detection;
• The calculation of the Dual Youla parameter which describes the para-
metric faults in the system;
• The calculation of output zeroing inputs is considered as these can be
used to arrive at an AFD solution without the nominal performance
degradation usually associated with active fault detecting schemes.
12
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2.1 Definitions
A number of concepts extensively used throughout this chapter are now briefly
defined:
• Nominal System: The state a system was designed to operate in. Most
systems spend the majority of time in this state.
• Faulty System: Any operating state other than the nominal. The
system might be in a degraded operational state, but this is not a pre-
requisite.
• Linear Fractional Transform: A conformal mapping of the from
ζ = as+b
cs+d which maps lines to circles and vice versa [74]. The com-
monly used S- to Z-plane bilinear transformation is an example of such
a transformation.
• Auxiliary Input: A signal injected into the system for the purpose of
fault detection. This signal is injected in addition to any required control
inputs.
• Residual Generation: An output generated from the system, related
to the parametric faults in the system. The signal is ideally zero in
nominal case, and non-zero in the faulty case.
• Dual Youla Parametrisation: A parametrisation of all systems which
can be stabilised by a single controller in terms of a single stable param-
eter [71].
2.2 System Setup
A generic two port model with uncertain parameters is given in transfer matrix
form as
E(s) = Ged(s,Θ)D(s) +Geu(s,Θ)U(s) (2.2.1)
Y (s) = Gyd(s,Θ)D(s) +Gyu(s,Θ)U(s) (2.2.2)
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d
u
w
e
y
z
Θ
G(s)
Figure 2.1: System model described in terms of the nominal plant G(s) and
the deviations from the nominal plant given by Θ
By using a linear fractional transform [3], the uncertain model parameters are
removed from the primary plant model and placed in a feedback path. This
modified setup is shown in figure 2.1.
Z(s) = Gzw(s,Θ)W (s) +Gzd(s,Θ)D(s) +Gzu(s,Θ)U(s) (2.2.3)
E(s) = Gew(s,Θ)W (s) +Ged(s,Θ)D(s) +Geu(s,Θ)U(s) (2.2.4)
Y (s) = Gyw(s,Θ)W (s) +Gyd(s,Θ)D(s) +Gyu(s,Θ)U(s) (2.2.5)
Or, alternatively a state-space realisation of this uncertain plant is given
by
x˙ = Ax+Bww +Buu+Bdd (2.2.6)
z = Czx+Dzww +Dzuu+Dzdd (2.2.7)
y = Cyx+Dyww +Dyuu+Dydd (2.2.8)
e = Cex+Deww +Deuu+Dedd (2.2.9)
where d ∈ Rr is the disturbance input, e ∈ Rq the error output, u ∈ Rm the
actuator input, y ∈ Rp the sensor output, w ∈ Rk an external input, and
z ∈ Rk an external output. The loop from z to w is closed through Θ, where
the diagonal elements of Θ describe the parametric faults of the system and is
nominally equal to zero.
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Plant
U˜p
M˜pN˜p
V˜ −1p
- +
η
r
d e
u y
+
Figure 2.2: System setup used for AFD in co-prime factors form. The auxiliary
input (η) as well as the residual signal (r) are also shown.
2.3 Coprime Factorisation
Given that the plant is stabilised by a controller K(s), a coprime factorisation
of the system Gyu(s) and K(s) is given by [55]
Gyu = NpM−1p = M˜−1p N˜p Np,Mp, N˜p, M˜p ∈ RH∞ (2.3.1)
K = UpV −1p = V˜ −1p U˜p Up, Vp, U˜p, V˜p ∈ RH∞ (2.3.2)
where the eight matrices must comply to the double Bezout equation, given
by  V˜p −U˜p
−N˜p M˜p
Mp Up
Np Vp
 =
Mp Up
Np Vp
 V˜p −U˜p
−N˜p M˜p
 =
I 0
0 I
 (2.3.3)
This coprime factorisation setup is shown in figure 2.2. It is important to note
that the coprime factors are systems, which may be realised as either transfer
matrices or state-space systems.
Assuming that observer based feedback control is applied, this coprime
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION 16
factorisation is equivalent to the following state space representation [75] 1
Mp Up
Np Vp
 =

A+BuF Bu −L
F I 0
Cy +DyuF Dyu I
 (2.3.4)
 V˜p −U˜p
−N˜p M˜p
 =

A+ LCy −(Bu + LDyu) L
F I 0
Cy −Dyu I
 (2.3.5)
where the feedback gain (F ) and observer gain (L) are chosen such that both
A+BuF and A+ LCy are stable.
From this point on, the Active Fault Detection problem is considered in
the open-loop case for the following reasons:
• Considering the active fault detection problem in the open-loop case
removes the solution’s dependency on the chosen control law, thereby
greatly simplifying the result.
• Using an open-loop setup removes the risk of the control law obscuring
the underlying system dynamics.
• It is possible to add a feedback control system separately if adequate
care is taken not to deteriorate the AFD performance significantly.
• Alternatively, the feedback control system may be designed first and this
controlled system can then again be considered as a open-loop system
for the purpose of AFD.
From the arguments given above it is now assumed that Gyu is open-loop
stable and therefore that AFD can be applied in the open-loop case. From this
point on, the value of the controller gain (F ) is assumed to be zero2. Given
1The equations above are given in block partition format with the vertical and horizontal
lines separating the matrix into the four standard state space matrices.
2In the open-loop case no feedback control is applied, therefore the feedback gain is zero.
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these assumptions, the equations given in [75] can be simplified as follows
Mp Up
Np Vp
 =

A Bu −L
0 I 0
Cy Dyu I
 (2.3.6)
 V˜p −U˜p
−N˜p M˜p
 =

A+ LCy −(Bu + LDyu) L
0 I 0
Cy −Dyu I
 (2.3.7)
From (2.3.6) and (2.3.7) it can be shown that,
Mp = V˜p = I Up = U˜p = 0 (2.3.8)
Furthermore, it can easily be shown that,
A+ LCy −(Bu + LDyu) L
0 I 0
Cy −Dyu I


A Bu −L
0 I 0
Cy Dyu I
 =
I 0
0 I
 (2.3.9)
and,
A Bu −L
0 I 0
Cy Dyu I


A+ LCy −(Bu + LDyu) L
0 I 0
Cy −Dyu I
 =
I 0
0 I
 (2.3.10)
therefore, (2.3.6) and (2.3.7) comply with the requirements stipulated by
(2.3.3).
2.3.1 Introducing the Auxiliary Input and Residual
Output
A residual vector can be generated by using the co-prime factors as follows
[54]
R = M˜pY − N˜pU (2.3.11)
It can be shown that this is equivalent to the vector r shown in figure 2.3 [4].
With reference to figure 2.3 an auxiliary signal η is introduced which excites
both the plant and estimator. This signal has no affect on r in the nominal
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. AN ARCHITECTURE FOR ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION 18
d
u
η
e
y
r
y˜
L
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P (s,Θ)
+
−
Figure 2.3: System setup used for AFD in state space form. The plant is
defined as in figure 2.1. The auxiliary input (η) as well as the residual signal
(r) are also shown.
case, but affects the residual signal if a postulated fault has occurred. In this
research, only single frequency periodic signals of the form
η =
[
A1 sin (ωt+ φ1) . . . Am sin (ωt+ φm)
]T
(2.3.12)
will be considered. This may also be given in terms of a single input signal as,
H = Hη(s)L{sin(ωt)} (2.3.13)
where Hη(s) is a stable LTI shaping filter3.
Next, define the system P (s) as
E(s,Θ) = Ped(s,Θ)D(s) + Peη(s,Θ)H(s) (2.3.14)
R(s,Θ) = Prd(s,Θ)D(s) + Prη(s,Θ)H(s) (2.3.15)
This is often written in the more compact form as,
E
R
 =
Ped Peη
Prd Prη
D
H
 (2.3.16)
where the dependence on s and Θ is not explicitly given. As is common place
in the literature, the dependence on s is often not explicitly shown in this
dissertation.
3The capital letter of η is technically H, but in order to avoid confusion H is used
instead.
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Input Filter DynamicsB
D
C +
Figure 2.4: System setup illustrating the basic principle behind input cancel-
lation. Note the zeroed signal after the B and D gains.
According to [54], the four transfer functions from the two inputs to both
outputs are given by
Ped(Θ) = Ged(Θ) (2.3.17)
Peη(Θ) = Geu(Θ) (2.3.18)
Prd(Θ) = Gyd(Θ) (2.3.19)
Prη(Θ) = Gyu(Θ)−Np = Gyu(Θ)−Gyu(0) (2.3.20)
where the simplifications obtained in equation (2.3.8) have been applied to the
equations given in [54]. Again, the dependence on s is not explicitly given.
In [54] it is noted that Prη is equal to the dual Youla parameter S. Accord-
ing to [71] and [54] it is possible to rewrite S or Prη as
Prη(Θ) = M˜pGyw(0)Θ (I −Gzw(0)Θ)−1Gzu (2.3.21)
where the simplifications obtained in (2.3.8) have been applied to the equations
given in [54]. For further background on the Youla parametrisation please refer
to [69] and [70].
2.4 Output Zeroing Input in MIMO Systems
2.4.1 Output Zeroing Input for a Nominal System
with Redundant Actuators
MIMO systems with redundant actuators can be excited by injecting distur-
bances into the null-space of the control matrix. It is important to note that
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using this method only allows for the detection of control or actuator faults,
and not changes in the other system matrices.
The system is excited in such a way as not to cause any nominal distur-
bance, therefore
|Peη(jω)H(jω)| = |Geu(jω)H(jω)| = 0 (2.4.1)
with, s = jω.
Figure 2.3 shows that the signals η and u are equal. It is further assumed
that the error signal is a function of a reference and the plant output, therefore
equation (2.4.1) implies
Buη = 0 Deuη = 0 (2.4.2)
with
Bu 6= 0 η 6= 0 (2.4.3)
Equations (2.4.2) and (2.4.3) are satisfied if
η ∈ (kerBu) ∩ (kerDeu) (2.4.4)
where ker is the kernel or null space of the given matrix. In other words the
input zeroing signal must be within the kernel of both Bu and Deu.
2.4.2 Output Zeroing Input for an Output nulling
MIMO System
In some MIMO systems it is possible to use output cancellation in order to
employ zero disturbance AFD without the limitations of using input cancel-
lation. The discussion provided here is based on the general output zeroing
problem discussed in [73].
In this section output zeroing inputs are derived for the excitation signal.
From equation (2.3.18), the auxiliary input to error output dynamics can be
described by the following state space model.
x˙0 = Ax+Buη (2.4.5)
e = Cex+Deuη (2.4.6)
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Input Filter DynamicsB
D
C +
Figure 2.5: System setup illustrating the basic principle behind output can-
cellation. Note the non-zero signal after C and D, and zeroed signal at the
output. This setup can be slightly altered for strictly proper systems.
with e = 0 for t ≥ 0.
The investigation provided here is divided into proper and strictly proper
systems4.
2.4.2.1 Strictly Proper Systems
For strictly proper systems, the first non-zero Markov parameter, at index k,
is given by, [73]
CeA
kBu 6= 0 (2.4.7)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
Further define the matrix [73]
Kk = I −Bu(CeAkBu)+CeAk (2.4.8)
Now, for strictly proper systems the output zeroing states are entirely con-
tained within the subspace [73]
x0(t) ∈
k⋂
l=0
kerCeAl (2.4.9)
and define the initial condition as,
x0(0) = x0 (2.4.10)
4The results provided here can be simplified for certain systems. Also note that the
output zeroing solution does not necessarily span the entire complex plain. For further
details refer to [73].
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Furthermore, the output zeroing states can be described by [73]
x0(t) = etKkAx0 +
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)KkABuηh(τ)dτ (2.4.11)
while the output zeroing excitation input is given by,
η(t) = −(CeAkBu)+CeAk+1etKkAx0
− (CeAkBu)+CeAk+1
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)KkABuηh(τ)dτ
+ ηh(t) (2.4.12)
with ηh(t) ∈ U which satisfies
CeA
kBuηh(t) = 0 (2.4.13)
2.4.2.2 Proper Systems
For proper systems the output zeroing states are entirely contained within the
subspace [73]
x0(t) ∈ ker(Ir −DeuD+eu)Ce (2.4.14)
where Ir is the right identity. Define the initial condition as,
x0(0) = x0 (2.4.15)
Furthermore, the output zeroing states can be described by [73]
x0(t) = et(A−BuD
+
euCe)x0
+
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)(A−BuD
+
euCe)Buηh(τ)dτ (2.4.16)
while the output zeroing input is given by,
η(t) = −D+euCeet(A−BuD
+
euCe)x0
−D+euCe
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)(A−BuD
+
euCe)Buηh(τ)dτ
+ ηh(t) (2.4.17)
with ηh(t) some piecewise continuous function which satisfies
Deuηh(t) = 0 (2.4.18)
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2.5 Summary
During this chapter the basic theoretical framework used to construct the
optimised AFD system was introduced and briefly discussed. The following
key concepts were considered:
• The introduction of an auxiliary fault detection signal into the system.
This signal is given by:
H = Hη(s)L{sin(ωt)} (2.5.1)
• The generation of a residual signal, to be used for the purpose of fault
detection. This signal is defined as:
R = M˜pY − N˜pU (2.5.2)
• The calculation of auxiliary signal inputs is considered for output as well
as input zeroing excitation schemes.
– An input zeroing auxiliary signal is a signal which complies with,
η ∈ (kerBu) ∩ (kerDeu) (2.5.3)
– An output zeroing auxiliary signal is a signal which complies with,
η(t) = −(CeAkBu)+CeAk+1etKkAx0
− (CeAkBu)+CeAk+1
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)KkABuηh(τ)dτ
+ ηh(t) (2.5.4)
for strictly proper systems, or
η(t) = −D+euCeet(A−BuD
+
euCe)x0
−D+euCe
∫ t
0
e(t−τ)(A−BuD
+
euCe)Buηh(τ)dτ
+ ηh(t) (2.5.5)
for proper systems.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Open-Loop Active
Fault Detection: The General
Case
In this chapter optimal open-loop AFD is investigated for general MIMO sys-
tems by making use of the theory presented in the previous chapter. In the
open-loop case accurate state estimation is not of primary importance, since
a separate state estimator for the purpose of applying feedback control can be
employed. Therefore, the estimator gains can be designed to optimise for AFD
performance. With this extra design freedom both the estimator as well as the
auxiliary signal can be designed to optimise for AFD performance, as opposed
to [54] where the estimator is treated as a fixed attribute of the pre-existing
control system.
Furthermore, optimal open-loop AFD is investigated in the presence of a
control input signal. It is assumed here that the primary source of excitation
is from the control input and not from any additional auxiliary signal. When
taking the control input as the primary source of excitation the optimising
is effectively performed for the average-case, as opposed to the worst-case
scenario when only the auxiliary input is considered.
Keeping this in mind, the following design goals are considered important
during the design of the optimal estimator and auxiliary signal pair:
1. Design the estimator gain so that A+LCy is stable. This is a necessary
24
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and sufficient condition for stability since the system is assumed to be
open-loop stable.
2. Design the auxiliary signal, η, in such a way as to limit performance
degradation of the stipulated performance metric. Since this is a linear
system, injecting a larger auxiliary signal will always lead to improved
AFD performance at the possible expense of additional degradation of
the nominal system performance. The AFD system must therefore op-
erate within a given performance degradation envelope.
3. Design the estimator gain, L, and the auxiliary signal, η, in order to
minimise the fault detection time. There are two main factors which
determine the detection speed - the detector threshold, and the average
slope of the detection signal after a failure.
4. Decide whether to optimise for the average- or worst-case. This deter-
mines if the control signal must be considered.
3.1 A Setup for Active Fault Detection in
General MIMO Systems
The optimisation requirements stated above in point 2, 3 and 4 are now for-
malized below.
Design goal 2 requires that the impact of the auxiliary signal on the system
error output be known and kept within the stipulated design constraint. Now,
consider design goal 3. This design goal requires that the impact of the aux-
iliary signal on the triggering output be known and maximised. Furthermore,
this design goal requires that the impact of the estimator gain on the nominal
detector noise level be known and minimised. A complying setup is shown in
figure 3.1.
With reference to this figure a number of definitions are now made:
• Define Λ0 and Λ1 as the nominal and faulty system AFD induced distur-
bance constraint respectively. Therefore ‖ (Peη(0, s)H(s)) ‖∞ ≤ Λ0 and
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Prη(Θ, L, s)
ηh η
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Hη(s)
TriggerD(s) h
Peη(Θ, s)
e
Hu(s)uh u
Prd(L, s)d
+
+
+
Figure 3.1: Setup used for Active Fault Detection. From left to right the
following is shown: input shaping filter; plant excitation dynamics; linearised
detector dynamics; and fault trigger. It should be noted that the fault trigger
is just a representation of the detection threshold, and not a separate dynamic
system.
‖ (Peη(Θ1, s)H(s)) ‖∞ ≤ Λ1 must hold for all t > 0 and the postulated
fault condition Θ1.
• Standard AFD is defined as an AFD implementation where Λ0 6= 0, while
Zero Disturbance AFD is defined as an AFD implementation where it is
possible to achieve Λ0 = 0.
• The signal ηh is a simple periodic signal of unity amplitude given by,
ηh = sinωt.
• The signal η is the excitation signal used for the purpose of AFD, and
is given by, H(s) = Hη(s)Hh(s) where Hη(s) is a filter which transforms
ηh into a signal of correct dimension which adheres to the performance
degradation constraints Λ0 and Λ1.
• The signal d is a zero mean white noise signal. This signal injects noise
into the residual signal through the disturbance dynamics, Prd(L, s). The
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Figure 3.2: Aspects of the Active Fault Detection Optimisation Problem.
noise injected into the residual must be of finite power, in other words
the H2 norm of Prd(L, s) must exist.
• When present, the signal u is an external control signal not under the
control of the AFD design, where ‖u‖2  ‖η‖2 However, for the purpose
of AFD modelling the control signal u is given by, U(s) = Hu(s)Uh(s),
where uh is zero mean white noise and the filter Hu(s) transforms the
infinite bandwidth input into a signal representative of the power distri-
bution of a practically realisable band-limited system input u.
• The control signal u is summed with the shaped excitation signal η before
entering the system.
• h is the signal on which thresholding is performed, and is given by,
H(s) = Dr(s)R(s). Where, Dr(s) is a linear approximation of the de-
tector dynamics.
From these definitions and the informal discussion provided earlier, the
following optimisation criteria is now formulated:
Criterion 1. Find the estimator gain L, excitation frequency ωη, and the
admissible shaping filter Hη(s), which maximises the average fault signal to
nominal noise ratio on h(t) over a fixed time period td.
The basic optimisation strategy is represented by figure 3.2. In the re-
mainder of this section the subsystems making up the optimal AFD setup
are considered and combined to arrive at the optimised AFD solution. With
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reference to figure 3.1 these subsystems are: the input shaping filter and how
it relates to the disturbance constraints; an approximated description of the
detector dynamics and how it relates to the excitation frequency; a characteri-
sation of the effect of the auxiliary signal control input on the residual output;
and a description of the nominal detection noise.
3.2 Disturbance Constraints and the
Auxiliary Signal Input Shaping Filter
Consider the novel AFD input shaping filter Hη(s) shown in figure 3.1. This
subsystem is responsible for transforming the single periodic signal ηh into an
auxiliary signal which complies with the given disturbance constraints. This
subsystem is additionally responsible for incorporating the majority of the
MIMO complexity.
The input shaping filter Hη(s) can be given by the following state space
model:
x˙η = AHηxη +BHηηh
η = CHηxη +DHηηh (3.2.1)
where, xη is the state vector for the input shaping filter.
3.2.1 Standard AFD
Implementing standard AFD results in a reduction in both the nominal and
faulty system performance. It is therefore of primary importance to limit the
nominal performance degradation. It is further noted that since the failed
system disturbance is simply a function of the nominal system, the failure
case as well as the nominal disturbance constraint, only a single constraint is
required. Therefore,
Λ0 = c0 Λ1 =∞ (3.2.2)
where, c0 is a constant.
The input shaping filter must be designed to satisfy the single constraint
Λ0. This single constraint does not lead to a fully defined Hη(s) in the case
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of MIMO systems, therefore an additional reasonable design decision must be
made. It is suggested that Hη(s) is designed such that each actuator is excited
to the same degree. Therefore
x˙η = 0xη + 0ηh
η = 0xη + aHη0ηh (3.2.3)
where Hη0 is chosen so that each actuator gain b is given by |ηi|/δimax = b1.
Assuming maximum additional system disturbance2, the maximum auxil-
iary signal amplitude is given by
σmax (H(jω)) = c0σmax(Peη(0, jω))−1
= c0σmax(Geu(0, jω))−1 (3.2.4)
where, (Peη(0, jω))−1 and (Geu(0, jω))−1 are the left inverses of Peη(0, jω)
and Geu(0, jω) respectively. As before these left inverses exist if and only
if Peη(0, jω) and Geu(0, jω) are of full row-rank.
Now, given that
H(s) = Hη(s)Hh(s) with Hη(s) = aH˜η(s) (3.2.5)
using equation 3.2.4 and noting that by definition ‖Hh(jω)‖ = 1, the following
holds:
a = c1σmax(Geu(0, jω)H˜η(jω))−1 (3.2.6)
where, (Geu(0, jω)H˜η(jω))−1 is the left inverse of Geu(0, jω)H˜η(jω). The left
inverse exists if and only if the number of error outputs do not exceed the
number of auxiliary inputs, and the row echelon form of Geu(0, jω)H˜η(jω)
contains pivot elements on every row. Otherwise stated, Geu(0, jω)H˜η(jω) is
of full row-rank.
The input shaping filter is now fully defined by equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.6).
1δimax is the maximum control authority for the specific control actuator, while b is a
constant
2This implies that the AFD induced disturbance is the maximum allowed by the design
constraint.
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3.2.2 Zero Disturbance AFD
By definition zero disturbance AFD results in zero nominal system perfor-
mance degradation, therefore
Λ0 = 0 Λ1 = c1 (3.2.7)
where c1 is a constant.
The input shaping filter Hη(s) must be designed to meet these two distur-
bance constraints. First consider the constraint Λ0 = 0. This implies that
Peη(s)Hη(s) = 0 (3.2.8)
Using the theory discussed earlier in this dissertation, Hη(S) is now calculated
for a few different scenarios.
Input Cancellation: From (2.4.2) and (2.5.3) it is simple to derive a
linear state space model to describe the input shaping filter.
x˙η = 0xη + 0ηh
η = 0xη + aHη0ηh (3.2.9)
where Hη0 is a base matrix for the kernel of Bu as well as of Deu. Therefore,
Hη0ηh ∈ ker B and Hη0ηh ∈ ker Deu.
Output Cancellation (Proper Systems) : If Deu is a matrix of full
row rank [73], then from (2.4.17) and (2.4.18) a linear state space model can
be derived to describe the input shaping filter.
x˙η = (A−BuD+euCe)xη +BuaHη0ηh
η = −D+euCexη + IaHη0ηh (3.2.10)
where Hη0 is a base matrix for the kernel of Deu. Therefore, Hη0ηh ∈ ker Deu.
In the general case the output zeroing input does not necessarily exist.
However, if the set of invariant zeros is non-empty an output-zeroing solution
must exist for each of these invariant zeros [73].
Output Cancellation (Strictly Proper Systems) : If CeAkBu is a
matrix of full row rank [73], then from equations (2.4.12) and (2.4.13) it is
simple to derive a linear state space model to describe the input shaping filter.
x˙η = KkAxη +BuaHη0ηh
η = −(CeAkBu)+CeAk+1xη + IaHη0ηh (3.2.11)
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where Hη0 is a base matrix for the kernel of CeAkBu Therefore, Hη0ηh ∈
ker CeAkBu. The value of k is defined by equation 2.4.7.
Next, consider the second disturbance constraint, Λ1 = c1. Although the
injection of the auxiliary signal does not affect nominal system performance, it
still causes a reduction in post failure performance. Now, assuming maximum
additional system disturbance, the maximum auxiliary signal is given by
σmax (H(jω)) = c1σmax(Peη(Θ, jω))−1
= c1σmax(Geu(Θ, jω))−1 (3.2.12)
where, (Peη(Θ, jω))−1 and (Geu(Θ, jω))−1 are the left inverses of (Peη(Θ, jω))
and (Geu(Θ, jω)) respectively. These left inverses exist if and only if the num-
ber of error outputs do not exceed the number of auxiliary inputs, and its
row echelon form contains pivot elements on every row. Otherwise stated,
Peη(Θ, jω) and Geu(Θ, jω) are of full row-rank.
Now, given that
H = Hη(s)Hh with Hη(s) = aH˜η(s) (3.2.13)
using equation 3.2.12 and noting that by definition ‖Hh(jω)‖ = 1, the follow-
ing holds:
a = c1σmax(Geu(Θ, jω)H˜η(jω))−1 (3.2.14)
where (Geu(Θ, jω)H˜η(jω))−1 is the left inverse of Geu(Θ, jω)H˜η(jω). The left
inverse exists if and only if the number of error outputs do not exceed the
number of auxiliary inputs, and the row echelon form of Geu(Θ, jω)H˜η(jω)
contains pivot elements on every row. Otherwise stated, Geu(Θ, jω)H˜η(jω) is
of full row-rank.
The input shaping filter is now fully defined by equations (3.2.9), (3.2.10),
(3.2.11), and (3.2.14)
3.3 Approximated Detector Dynamics
The aim of this section is to approximately characterise the detector’s response
in terms of excitation frequency as a linear transfer function. The detector is
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responsible for detecting the small change in the residual signal due to a failure.
Although not the only possible approach, in this dissertation the focus is on
using an integrative change in mean detector. This type of detector is used
to detect small changes in the mean value of a signal by means of integration.
The other main detector type is called a variance detector, and focuses on
detecting changes in the variance of a signal.
The optimisation problem presented in research such as [55] and [54] does
not consider the effect of the detector dynamics on the AFD optimisation
problem.
As previously stated the auxiliary signal is a filtered single frequency peri-
odic signal of the following form:
H = Hη(s)L(sin(ωηt)) (3.3.1)
Since all filters as well as the system are linear and stable, and given enough
time for transient behaviour to have ceased. The residual output resulting in
the largest singular value is of the form
r(t) = a sin(ωηt+ φ) + ν(t) (3.3.2)
where ν(t) is a zero mean noise component. It is important to remember that
for a linear system a sinusoidal input will result in a sinusoidal output of the
same frequency and a zero mean input will result in a zero mean output [57].
To generate a detection signal with a zero mean in the nominal case and a
non-zero mean in the faulty case, the residual is multiplied by a single frequency
periodic signal of frequency ωη. This allows the optimisation to be performed
at a single frequency point, additionally this method is used extensively in the
literature [57]. The detection signal is therefore given by
ν0(t) = ν(t) sin(ωηt+ φ0) (3.3.3)
in the nominal case, and
ν1(t) = ν(t) sin(ωηt+ φ1) + a1 sin2(ωηt+ φ1) (3.3.4)
in the faulty case. Where subscript 0 and 1 are used to indicate the nominal
and faulty cases receptively.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL OPEN-LOOP ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION: THE
GENERAL CASE 33
Now, consider the second term of equation (3.3.4). This term has a non-
zero mean value, and is used for fault detection. Since it is not known at what
time a fault will occur it is further assumed that φ1 = 0 3.
The detector integrates ν1, and after a time td seconds the output is given
by
h = a1
∫ td
0
sin2(ωt)dt (3.3.5)
= a1
(
td
2 −
sin(2ωtd)
4ω
)
(3.3.6)
It can be seen that as ω becomes large, h approaches a1 td2 . Furthermore, when
ω becomes small, h approaches zero.
It is now shown that the detector’s integration action can be closely ap-
proximated by a second order transfer function of the form
Dr(s) ≈ a1tds
2
2
(
s2 + 2
(
a
td
)
s+
(
a
td
)2) (3.3.7)
where a is a constant approximately equal to one.
The value of a for small values of ω is calculated by setting equation (3.3.6)
equal to the magnitude of (3.3.7)
td
2 −
sin(2ωtd)
4ω =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
td(jω)2
2
(
(jω)2 + 2
(
a
td
)
(jω) +
(
a
td
)2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.3.8)
where s = jω.
The function sin(2ωtd), is approximated by a second order Taylor series
expansion.
td
2 −
2ωtd − (2ωtd)33!
4ω =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
td(jω)2
2
(
(jω)2 + 2
(
a
td
)
(jω) +
(
a
td
)2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.3.9)
Now, assuming that a, td and ω are positive, real numbers, equation (3.3.9)
is simplified as
ω2t3d
2(a+ tdω)2
= ω
2t3d
3
2(a+ tdω)2 = 3 (3.3.10)
3Of primary interest is the effect of the excitation frequency on detector performance.
This parameter can be designed for, while the phase at which a failure occurs is random.
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Figure 3.3: True frequency response of detector versus seconded order approx-
imated response. For this plot td = 1 and the magnitude is normalised so that
limω→∞ h(ω) = 1.
Therefore, as ω approaches zero,
a =
√
3
2 (3.3.11)
From figure 3.3, equation (3.3.11) and equation (3.3.7), it can be seen that
auxiliary signal frequencies lower than 1
td
are severely penalised by the detector
dynamics. It is therefore up to the control engineer to select a reasonable
minimum targeted detection time. Please note that it is not suggested that it
is impossible to detect a fault in less time than td , merely that doing so may4
require a much larger change in ν.
3.3.1 Using a Leaky Detector
It is rarely possible to know the system model with perfect accuracy, there-
fore it is often necessary to employ a leaky detector. The detector discussed
previously is now modified to introduce a leakiness factor.
4The optimal auxiliary signal frequency is not simply a function of the detector dynamics,
but is also influenced by other factors, such as Prη(Θ).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL OPEN-LOOP ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION: THE
GENERAL CASE 35
10−4 10−2 100 102 104
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Frequency (rad.s−1)
M
ag
ni
tu
de
Approximation Error
Figure 3.4: True frequency response of detector versus seconded order approx-
imated response approximation induced error. For this plot td = 1 and the
magnitude is normalised so that limω→∞ h(ω) = 1.
Over the time period td the leaky detector provides a constant reduction
to the detector output relative to the extent of the leakiness employed. Us-
ing the Taylor series expansion from equation (3.3.9), the leaky detector is
approximately given by
h ≈ td2 −
2ωtd − (2ωtd)33!
4ω −
td
cl
(3.3.12)
where cl is the chosen leakiness factor.
From figure 3.5 it can be seen that employing a leaky detector causes a
severe performance drop in the low cut-off region of the detector dynamics.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the leaky detector provides an asymptote
in the low frequency region. The position of this asymptote line is given by
setting equation (3.3.12) to zero and solving for ω as follows
td
2 −
2ω0td − (2ω0td)33!
4ω0
− td
cl
= 0 (3.3.13)
assuming cltd 6= 0, ω0 > 0 and td2  tdcl ,
ω0 =
√
3√
cltd
(3.3.14)
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Figure 3.5: Detector response plot showing the effect of using a leaky detector.
In this case td was chosen as 1 second. As the leakiness increases, the severe
performance drop moves closer to
√
3
2/td.
Since this area is typically excluded as an optimal solution due to the
detector dynamics the extra dynamics, can usually be ignored. However, it is
advisable to remain well clear of the ω0 asymptote.
It is important to take note that the leakiness factor cl introduces a small
additional error into the second order approximation, given by
td
cl
for ω 
√
3/2
td
(3.3.15)
3.4 The Auxiliary Input Signal
As previously stated, the transfer function from auxiliary input to residual
output is given by the dual Youla parameter. With reference to equation
(2.3.21), this parameter is given by
Prη(Θ) = M˜pGywΘ (I −GzwΘ)−1Gzu (3.4.1)
As is evident from (2.3.7), the transfer function M˜ is dependent on L, therefore
Prη(Θ, L) = M˜p(L)GywΘ (I −GzwΘ)−1Gzu (3.4.2)
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Prη is an indication of the effectiveness of the auxiliary signal in altering
the residual, therefore it is advantageous to maximise Prη.
max
L
(Prη(Θ, L)) (3.4.3)
The exact norm used to maximise the above will be disused later.
3.5 Noise Covariance on Nominal Residual
Signal
From the criterion, it would seem that the noise covariance on h(t) is required.
However, if it is assumed that the system has been active for a long time,
the dynamic effect of the detector is of minimal importance. Therefore, it is
acceptable to consider the noise covariance on the nominal residual instead.
This assumption can further be motivated as follows:
• From the detector dynamics it can be seen that the detector cut-off
frequency becomes lower as td increases. In other words, the effect of the
detector becomes smaller as time passes.
• It is reasonable to assume that the detector has been active far longer
than what the minimum targeted detection time is. This implies that the
detector dynamics will affect the post failure detection signal far more
than the disturbance dynamics.
• It is advantageous to remain mostly detector agnostic. Doing this al-
lows the methods presented here to be applicable to a larger number of
systems. This was also the case for the underlying theory.
The nominal residual noise power determines the maximum attainable de-
tector sensitivity for a given false detection rate5. It is therefore desirable to
minimise the residual covariance. It is not suggested that the optimal AFD
system simply minimises output noise covariance, but rather that in the final
5Calculating statistical metrics, such as the false detection rate, is beyond the scope this
dissertation. The interested reader should refer to literature such as [76]. It is assumed that
a simple change detector is used. If this is not the case refer to literature on detector theory
and the universally most powerful test, such as [77].
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optimisation a lower output noise covariance is advantageous, as it leads to a
higher signal to noise ratio.
The covariance on the residual prior to a fault occurring can be calculated
using the H2 system norm. The H2 norm for a stable proper continuous system
is given by [78]
‖H‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [H(jω)∗H(jω)] dω (3.5.1)
From equations (2.3.19) (with Θ = 0) and (3.5.1), the output noise power
is dependant on the estimator gain, and is given by
‖Prd0(L)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [Prd0(jω, L)∗Prd0(jω, L)] dω (3.5.2)
The estimator gain which minimises the nominal residual covariances sat-
isfies
max
L
(
1
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(3.5.3)
3.6 The Control Input and the Control
Shaping Filter
Consider the control input u shown in figure 3.1. As previously stated, the
control input is not under the control of the AFD system. However, this does
not necessary exclude it from the AFD optimisation problem. Its influence may
be considered using a novel yet simple approach as described in this section.
The influence of the control signal may be described in terms of the following
scenarios:
• The degenerative scenario: The control signal is exactly given by the
negative of the auxiliary signal. In this scenario no AFD or control is
performed. However, this case is excluded, since it is given that u η.
• The best-case scenario: The control signal is a simple periodic signal
of optimal excitation frequency.
• The worst-case scenario: The control signal is equal to zero.
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• The average scenario: The control signal is given by a band-limited,
finite power signal.
In this investigation the worst-case and average scenarios are considered im-
portant, as these are related to minimum and average AFD performance pa-
rameters.
From the same figure it can be seen that the control input enters the system
in the same manner as the auxiliary signal and therefore,
Pru(Θ, L) = Prη(Θ, L) = M˜p(L)GywΘ (I −GzwΘ)−1Gzu (3.6.1)
Pru is an indication of the effectiveness of the control signal in altering the
residual in the faulty system, therefore it is advantageous to maximise Pru.
max
L
(Pru(Θ, L)) (3.6.2)
Next, consider the input shaping filter Hu(s) shown in figure 3.1. This
subsystem is responsible for transforming the zero-mean white noise signal uh
into a signal representative of the power distribution of a practically realisable
band-limited system input u. For the purpose of this investigation a simple
low-pass filter of the form
Hu(s) =
(
a
s+ a
)n
(3.6.3)
is used, where a gives a cut-off frequency much higher than our system dy-
namics and n is large enough to ensure finite system bandwidth.
3.7 Combining Results
In this chapter, the components of the optimal open-loop AFD setup have been
investigated. Firstly, the input shaping filter was introduced and discussed for
a number of different scenarios. Next, approximated detector dynamics were
derived. Then the noise power on the residual of nominal system was min-
imised. This allows the sensitivity of the detector to be maximised. Equations
were derived which can be used to maximise the effect of η on r. Lastly, equa-
tions were derived which can be used to maximise the effect of u on r. This
allows the detector threshold to be reached as fast as possible.
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From the equations given in 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6, the transfer function from
input ηh to the thresholding signal h is given by
Phηh(Θ, L, s) = D(s)Prη(Θ, L, s)Hη(s) (3.7.1)
and the transfer function from input u to the thresholding signal h is given by
Phuh(Θ, L, s) = Dr(s)Pru(Θ, L, s)Hu(s) (3.7.2)
Worst-Case Scenario: The peak gain in the frequency response of a
linear system is given by the H∞ norm
‖H(s)‖∞ = max
ω
σmax (H(jω)) (3.7.3)
Therefore,
‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞ = maxω σmax (D(jω)Prη(Θ, L, jω)Hη(jω)) (3.7.4)
Therefore, the estimator gain which leads to the largest value of h after the
time period td is given by
max
L
(‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞) (3.7.5)
Even though Prηh(Θ, L, s) is a MIMO system in the general case, ‖Phηh(L)‖∞
is always a single norm in terms of L , as it relates the effect of a single periodic
signal on the output resulting in the largest singular value.
As was stated in criterion 1, the average fault signal to nominal noise ratio
on h(t) must be maximised, therefore from (3.5.3) and (3.7.5),
max
L
(‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(3.7.6)
where the optimal estimator gain, Lopt satisfies (3.7.6), while the optimal
auxiliary signal frequency is the excitation frequency argument maximising
‖Phηh(Θ, Lopt)‖∞.
Average Scenario: Since the input is no longer a simple sinusoidal signal,
it is more reasonable to maximise the power output of the detector due to the
control excitation. The total output power of a linear system is given by the
H2 norm
‖H(s)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [H(jω)∗H(jω)] dω (3.7.7)
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Therefore,
‖Phuh(L)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [Phuh(Θ, L, jω)∗Phuh(Θ, L, jω)] dω (3.7.8)
Therefore, the estimator gain which leads to the largest h is given by
max
L
(‖Phuh(Θ, L)‖2) (3.7.9)
As was stated in criterion 1 the average fault signal to nominal noise ratio
on h(t) must be maximised, therefore from (3.5.3) and (3.7.9),
max
L
(‖Phuh(Θ, L)‖2
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(3.7.10)
where the optimal estimator gain, Lopt satisfies (3.7.10).
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Chapter 4
Optimal Open-Loop Active
Fault Detection: The Simplified
SISO Case
In this chapter optimal open-loop AFD is investigated for the simplified SISO
case. The purpose of this chapter is to reduce the full MIMO theory into a
far simpler SISO framework. Restricting the investigation to SISO systems
leads to significant simplifications highlighting key aspects and properties of
the optimisation framework, as well as providing the new reader with an easier
to understand starting point.
The focus in this chapter will be on those aspects which are simplified by
this SISO system restriction. To further simplify the investigation the control
signal is removed from the optimisation problem. This implies that only the
worst-case AFD scenario can be considered.
In SISO systems, the injection of the auxiliary signal always results in a
reduction of the nominal system performance. Therefore, unlike MIMO sys-
tems, the nominal performance degradation is always of concern. Keeping this
in mind, the following simplified design goals are considered to be important
during the design of the optimal estimator and auxiliary signal pair:
1. Design the estimator gain so that A+ LCy is stable.
2. Design the auxiliary signal, η, in such a way as to limit nominal perfor-
mance degradation.
42
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Peη(Θ, S)
e
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d
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Figure 4.1: Setup used for Active Fault Detection. From left to right the
following is shown: plant excitation dynamics; linearised detector dynamics;
and fault trigger.
3. Design the estimator gain, L, and the auxiliary signal, η, in order to
minimise the fault detection time.
4.1 A Setup for Active Fault Detection in
SISO Systems
Design goal 2 requires that the impact of the auxiliary signal on the system
error output be known and kept within the stipulated design constraint. Now,
consider design goal 3. This design goal requires that the impact of the aux-
iliary signal on the triggering output be known and maximised. Furthermore,
this design goal requires that the impact of the estimator gain on the nominal
detector noise level be known and minimised. A complying setup is shown
in figure 4.1, noting that the input shaping filter of the MIMO system was
replaced by a simple gain α.
With reference to this figure, a number of definitions are now made:
• Define Λ0 as the nominal system AFD disturbance constraint. Therefore,
σmax (Peη(0, s)H) ≤ Λ0 must hold for all t > 0 and the postulated fault
condition Θ1.
• The signal η is the excitation signal used for the purpose of AFD, and is
given by η = a sin(ωt), where a is a simple gain such that the performance
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Figure 4.2: Aspects of the Active Fault Detection Optimisation Problem.
degradation constraint Λ0 is adhered to.
• The signal d is a zero mean white noise signal. This signal injects noise
into the residual signal through the disturbance dynamics, Prd(L, s). The
noise injected into the residual must be of finite power, in other words
the H2 norm of Prd(L, s) must exist.
• h is the signal on which thresholding is performed, and is given by H =
Dr(s)R, where Dr(s) is a linear approximation of the detector dynamics.
From these definitions and the informal discussion provided earlier, the
following optimisation criteria is now formulated.
Criterion 2. Find the estimator gain L, excitation frequency ωη, and the
admissible gain which maximises the average fault signal to nominal noise
ratio on h(t) over a fixed time period td.
The basic optimisation strategy is again shown graphically by figure 4.2.
In the remainder of this section the subsystems making up the optimal AFD
setup are considered and combined to arrive at the optimised AFD solution.
With reference to figure 4.1, these subsystems are: the auxiliary signal and
how it relates to the disturbance constraint; an approximated description of
the detector dynamics and how it relates to the excitation frequency; a char-
acterisation of the effect of the auxiliary signal on the residual output; and a
description of the nominal detection noise.
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4.2 Disturbance Constraint and the
Auxiliary Signal
Implementing AFD results in a reduction in nominal system performance.
It is therefore of primary importance to limit this performance degradation.
Therefore,
Λ0 = c0 (4.2.1)
where c0 is a constant.
The auxiliary signal must be designed to satisfy the single constraint Λ0.
Assuming maximum additional system disturbance, the maximum auxiliary
signal amplitude is given by
a = c0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Peη(0, jω)
∣∣∣∣∣ = c0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Geu(0, jω)
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.2.2)
The Dual Youla Parameter remains unchanged from the MIMO case, and
is simply restated here for clarity
Prη(Θ, L) = M˜p(L)GywΘ (I −GzwΘ)−1Gzu (4.2.3)
As before it is advantageous to maximise Prη.
max
L
(Prη(Θ, L)) (4.2.4)
4.3 Approximated Detector Dynamics
The derivation of the approximated detector dynamics remain unchanged from
the MIMO case, and is therefore not shown again. However for clarity the
result is briefly restated here.
The detector’s integration action can be closely approximated by a second
order transfer function of the form
Dr(s) ≈ tds
2
2
(
s2 + 2
(
a
td
)
s+
(
a
td
)2) (4.3.1)
where a is a constant given by
a =
√
3
2 (4.3.2)
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4.4 Noise Covariance on Nominal Residual
Signal
The nominal noise covariance remains unchanged from the MIMO case, and
is simply restated here for clarity:
‖Prd0(L)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [Prd0(jω, L)∗Prd0(jω, L)] dω (4.4.1)
The estimator gain which minimises the nominal residual covariances sat-
isfies
max
L
(
1
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(4.4.2)
4.5 Combining Results
In this section the components of the simplified optimal open-loop SISO AFD
setup is investigated. Of primary importance is the simplification of the input
shaping filter into a simple gain. From the equations given in 4.2 and 4.3, the
transfer function from input ηh to the thresholding signal h is given by
Phηh(Θ, L, s) = aDr(s)Prη(Θ, L, s) (4.5.1)
The peak gain in the frequency response of a linear SISO system is given
by the H∞ norm
‖H(s)‖∞ = max
ω
|H(jω)| (4.5.2)
Therefore,
‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞ = maxω |aDr(jω)Prη(Θ, L, jω)| (4.5.3)
Therefore, the estimator gain which leads to the largest h is given by
max
L
(‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞) (4.5.4)
As was stated in criterion 2, the average fault signal to nominal noise ratio
on h(t) must be maximised. Therefore from (4.4.2) and (4.5.4),
max
L
(‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(4.5.5)
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where the optimal estimator gain, Lopt satisfies (4.5.5), while the optimal
auxiliary signal frequency is the excitation frequency argument maximising
‖Phηh(Θ, Lopt)‖∞.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Open-Loop Active
Fault Detection: Discussion
In this chapter the novel theoretical framework developed in the previous chap-
ters is discussed. This includes choosing the appropriate optimisation scheme,
selecting a reasonable targeted detection time, and solving the optimisation
problem. Additionally, a brief summary of the active fault detection framework
is provided.
5.1 Selecting the AFD Implementation
In the previous chapters a number of different AFD methods are introduced.
These methods range from simple SISO methods to far more complex zero-
disturbance MIMO methods. From these chapters it can be seen that the main
AFD implementations are:
• Standard SISO AFD: This is by far the simplest of the proposed AFD
implementations. This method can only be applied to open-loop stable
LTI SISO systems.
• Standard MIMO AFD: This is an extension of the SISO theory to
MIMO systems. This method can be applied to any open-loop stable
LTI MIMO system.
48
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Figure 5.1: Active Fault Detection Framework Selection Proses. The section
or subsection related to the auxiliary input design for each framework is shown
in brackets.
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• MIMOAFD with input zeroing: This is an extension of the standard
MIMO AFD method which decouples the auxiliary excitation from the
system state dynamics in the nominal case. This is done by injecting
the excitation signal into the input null-space. Therefore, only actuator
faults are detectable when using input cancellation. This method can be
applied to open-loop stable LTI MIMO systems with a non-empty input
null-space.
• MIMO AFD with output zeroing: This is an alternative extension
of the standard MIMO AFD method which decouples the auxiliary ex-
citation from the system output dynamics in the nominal case. This is
performed by designing the input shaping filter in such a way that the
excitation is cancelled in the measurement equation. This method can
be applied to proper open-loop stable LTI MIMO systems when Deu is a
matrix of full row rank or to strictly proper open-loop stable LTI MIMO
systems when CeAkBu is a matrix of full row rank. Furthermore, care
should be taken that the excitation injected into the individual actua-
tors and states are within acceptable limits. This is especially of concern
when one or more of the system outputs are strongly correlated to only
a subset of the system states. Stated differently, this method is most
suited to systems where the output is strongly correlated to all system
states and inputs.
5.2 Average or Worst-Case Optimisations
As is discussed in chapter 3, the optimisation can either be performed for the
average or worst-case performance scenarios. Both of these approaches have
advantages and disadvantages, which are now briefly discussed:
• In general, the worst-case optimisation is simpler to perform. It avoids
having to model the power spectrum of the control input.
• It is true that the average-case optimisation will, in most cases, lead to
superior detection performance. However, it should be noted that the
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effect of this is relatively limited since the excitation provided by the
control signal far outweighs that of the auxiliary signal.
• In most cases the results obtained will be very similar, with just a small
shift in the excitation frequency and filter bandwidth.
5.3 Choosing the Targeted Detection Time
One of the parameters required by the optimisation problem presented is the
targeted detection time. This parameter places a soft lower bound on the op-
timal excitation frequency, estimator bandwidth, as well as the fault detection
time. When selecting this design parameter the following criteria should be
considered:
• Changing td provides a mechanism for exchanging small error detection
performance (sensitivity) for detection speed and vice versa. A longer
td provides more sensitivity but slower detection speed for larger errors
while a shorter td provides less sensitivity but faster detection speed for
larger errors.
• The shortest reasonable td is determined by the inverse of the system
bandwidth. As the minimum excitation frequency is pushed beyond the
system bandwidth, the efficacy of the excitation signal starts to diminish.
• The longest reasonable td is determined by the fault detection specifica-
tion.
Figure 5.2 shows the effect of varying the targeted detection time. It can
be seen from the figure that as td is shortened the detection gain is reduced
and vice versa.
5.4 Using the Open-Loop AFD Optimisation
in a Closed-Loop system
Solving the optimisation problem in the open-loop case is substantially sim-
plified when compared to solving the closed-loop problem directly. Therefore
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Figure 5.2: Peak gain plot showing the effect of the targeted detection time.
As td becomes shorter the optimal estimator bandwidth increases, while the
peak gain is significantly reduced. This is indicated by the arrow in the figure.
it is of particular interest to investigate the effect of using such a simplified
optimisation for closed-loop systems.
The following must be considered when applying the AFD system to closed-
loop systems:
• The auxiliary signal must ideally become part of the reference input in
order to avoid being rejected as a disturbance by the control system. The
auxiliary signal is therefore not an unknown disturbance to the closed-
loop controller.
• When injecting the auxiliary signal in this manner, the controller band-
width must be substantially larger than the auxiliary excitation fre-
quency. This prevents the controller from rejecting the desired excitation
signal.
• The magnitude of the auxiliary input signal must be adjusted in order
to compensate for the effect of the control system. This adjustment
compensates for the fact that the auxiliary signal now forms part of
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the reference input and must ensure that the desired output disturbance
constraint is met.
• A stable control loop changes the post fault system behaviour by partially
or completely rejecting the change in the system behaviour. Therefore,
the output of the post fault system might be unchanged from the nominal
system.
The first three points mentioned above are self explanatory, therefore fur-
ther details are not provided. The final point is now analysed in more detail.
When analysing the effect of closing a control loop on the post fault system
a simple, practical approach is needed in order to maintain the simplicity of
using the open-loop optimisation. The following approach is taken:
• It is assumed that the closed-loop system remains stable.
• The control system will at most completely reject the change in the
system.
• The completely rejected case therefore represents the largest performance
change from the faulty open-loop to faulty closed-loop system.
• Only the maximum change is analysed, with partially rejected faults ex-
periencing AFD performance changes somewhere between this maximum
and the open-loop performance.
Denote the maximum change in post failure error signal amplitude as,
∆max =
|P (Θ1)eηclHcl|
|P (Θ1)eηolHol|
(5.4.1)
where, Θ1 denotes the postulated fault case. As stated above, the largest
change scenario is when the fault is completely rejected. Additionally, the
closed-loop excitation signal has been adjusted so that
|P (0)eηclHcl| = |P (0)eηolHol| (5.4.2)
holds. For equation (5.4.2) it is assumed that the nominal disturbance is non-
zero, therefore it is not suitable for the output and input cancellation schemes.
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From equation (5.4.1), (5.4.2), and the details noted above the maximum
change in post failure error signal amplitude is given by
∆max =
|P (0)eηclHcl|
|P (Θ1)eηolHol|
(5.4.3)
Therefore, the change in post failure error signal is given by the ratio of the
nominal closed loop output disturbance and the post-failure open-loop distur-
bance output. This result implies the following:
• If the failure results in a reduction to the excitation, the controller will
increase the system input thereby improving the fault detection perfor-
mance versus the open-loop case.
• However, if the failure results in an increase to the excitation, the con-
troller will reduce the system input thereby reducing the fault detection
performance versus the open-loop case.
Please refer to section 6.7 for a detailed example.
5.5 Solving the Optimisation Problem
For simple first and second order problems the optimisation problem can easily
be solved by simple numerical methods, and can be visualised using simple
plots. A basic solver is shown in figure 5.3. The solver starts at a frequency
far below what would be reasonable for the giving value of td. It then simply
solves for a number of frequency points until it reaches a value far above the
system bandwidth. The largest value is then selected, and used to calculate
the optimal estimator gain as well as excitation frequency.
However, for more complex problems drawing simple plots becomes imprac-
tical. In these cases the optimisation problem can be solved using a number
of standard advanced numerical techniques. For a detailed discussion of these
and other techniques please refer to [79] and [80]. Ultimately even the most
efficient algorithm will be undone by the exponential time complexity of the
optimisation problem as the number of states increase.
If, however, a slightly suboptimal solution is acceptable, the time complex-
ity problem can be easily overcome by restricting the estimator error dynamics
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Figure 5.3: A simple algorithm for solving the AFD optimisation problem.
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to that of a simple low-pass filter. This modified problem leads to the following
optimisation criteria in the general case:
Criterion 3. Find the estimator bandwidth ωL, excitation frequency ωη, and
the admissible shaping filter Hη(s) which maximises the average fault signal to
nominal noise ratio on h(t) over a fixed time period td.
Or in the simplified SISO case:
Criterion 4. Find the estimator bandwidth ωL, excitation frequency ωη, and
admissible gain a which maximises the average fault signal to nominal noise
ratio on h(t) over a fixed time period td.
When using this modified criterion the estimator gain in equation (3.7.6)
is determined via the optimal bandwidth and the chosen filter topology, there-
fore the time complexity of the numerical solution is now independent of the
number of states. Furthermore, using this problem setup allows the use of
the same simple numerical methods to solve higher order problems, as was
suggested previously for first order problems.
Finally, it is important to note that even though the equations contain a
number of linear system inversions it is not necessary to solve these explicitly.
For SISO and single output MIMO systems the inversion can be performed
easily enough. However, for more complex MIMO problems the system inverse
might not even exist. In these cases it is easily solved by performing the
inversion numerically at the points of interest, rather than attempting to derive
an analytic solution.
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5.6 Summary of Theoretical Development
Optimal open-loop active fault detection is investigated for stable systems.
The design of the estimator is considered an integral part of the AFD opti-
misation process instead of being a fixed controller attribute. The research
presented in [69], [71], [54] and [55] is simplified for the open-loop case consid-
ered. Equations are derived to minimise the noise covariance on the nominal
residual output as well as to maximise the detection signal. In order to realise
a non-trivial solution, the theory is extended to include dynamical effects of
the detector. It is found that this effect can be closely approximated by a
second order transfer function, with a low-pass cut-off frequency determined
by the minimum targeted detection time design parameter.
When optimising for the worst-case AFD scenario, the resulting optimal
estimator and auxiliary signal pair is found to be given by
max
L
(‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(5.6.1)
where the optimal estimator gain, Lopt, satisfies (5.6.1), while the optimal
auxiliary signal frequency is the excitation frequency argument maximising
‖Phηh(Θ, Lopt)‖∞.
However, when optimising for the average-case AFD scenario, the resulting
optimal estimator and auxiliary signal pair is given by
max
L
(‖Phuh(Θ, L)‖2
‖Prd0(L)‖2
)
(5.6.2)
where the optimal estimator gain, Lopt satisfies (5.6.2), while the optimal
auxiliary signal frequency is the excitation frequency argument maximising
‖Phηh(Θ, Lopt)‖∞.
‖Prd0(L)‖2 gives the noise covariance on the nominal residual signal, and
is given by
‖Prd0(L)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [Prd0(jω, L)∗Prd0(jω, L)] dω (5.6.3)
‖Phηh(L)‖∞ describes the effectiveness of the auxiliary signal in altering
the detector output, and is given by,
‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖∞ = maxω σmax (Dr(jω)Prη(Θ, L, jω)Hη(jω)) (5.6.4)
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where, Hη(s) captures the input shaping filter dynamics, Prη(Θ, L, s) the sys-
tem dynamics from the auxiliary input to residual output, and Dr(s) the de-
tector dynamics.
Alternatively, ‖Phηh(Θ, L)‖2 describes the effectiveness of the control signal
in altering the detector output and is given by
‖Phuh(Θ, L)‖2 =
√
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Trace [Phuh(Θ, L, jω)∗Phuh(Θ, L, jω)] dω (5.6.5)
for the average-case optimisation.
Together these three equations form the basis of the signal to noise ratio
based optimisation presented here.
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Chapter 6
Illustrative Examples
In the previous chapters a number of Active Fault Detection concepts are in-
troduced and explored. These concepts are then used to derive an estimator-
based theoretical AFD optimisation framework. In this chapter this theoretical
framework is applied to a number of simple illustrative examples. These ex-
amples are purposefully designed to provide insight into the chosen theory or
concept, and are not meant to be exhaustive, practical or entirely realistic.
6.1 General Problem Setup
The examples given in this chapter all follow the same basic problem setup,
which is now briefly introduced.
For nearly all the problems considered the following procedure is followed:
1. First, the generic system model used for the example is introduced.
2. Next, the fault model is introduced and added to the system model. The
fault dynamics are placed in a feedback path by using a linear fractional
transform.
3. Following this, the system is augmented with a basic disturbance or noise
model.
4. Next, the specific numeric values are provided and the optimisation is
performed to find the optimal estimator bandwidth.
60
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5. With the estimator bandwidth known, the optimal estimator gain and
auxiliary excitation frequency can be determined.
The disturbance model used throughout this and the next chapter is now
briefly introduced.
6.1.1 The Disturbance Model
For the examples in this chapter the following simple noise model is used.
• Zero mean white process noise which enters the system in the same
manner as the control input
• Bandwidth limited zero mean white measurement noise
• The error signal is equal to the plant output
This disturbance model can be described by the following state space model: x˙
x˙n
 =
A 0
0 c
 x
xn
+
kP
−c
 d (6.1.1)
e =
[
C km
]  x
xn
 (6.1.2)
where A and C are system matrices, kP and km are the process and measure-
ment noise gains, and −c is the measurement noise bandwidth.
6.2 Example 1: Limitations of The Existing
Theory
This simple example will demonstrate the problem with simply applying the
previously existing theory to the open loop optimal AFD problem. It will be
shown that using the existing Dual Youla based theory in this manner leads
to a trivial solution, because the existing theory was intended to be used with
a pre-existing estimator, and not to be used in designing an estimator for
optimal AFD.
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Figure 6.1: AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth. ωLopt is
given by peak of ‖Phη(Θ,L)‖∞‖Prd0 (L)‖2 .
In general, a first order linear differential equation is given by the following
equation:
x˙ = ax+ bu (6.2.1)
This can be represented by the following state space representation.
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b
]
u (6.2.2)
y =
[
1
]
x (6.2.3)
Consider the following fault model:
a = a0 (1 + θa) (6.2.4)
b = b0 (1 + θb) (6.2.5)
where, θa and θb are zero in the nominal case.
Using an upper linear fractional transform the system can be written as
x˙ =
[
a0
]
x+
[
a0 b0
]
w +
[
b0
]
u (6.2.6)
z =
1
0
x+
0
1
u (6.2.7)
y = [1]x (6.2.8)
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with,
w =
θa 0
0 θb
 z (6.2.9)
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. In this example, the model
introduced at the start of this chapter will be used.
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model: x˙
x˙n
 =
a0 0
0 c
 x
xn
+
a0 b0
0 0
w
+
b
0
u+
kP
−c
 d (6.2.10)
z =
1 0
0 0
 x
xn
+
0
1
u (6.2.11)
y =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.2.12)
e =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.2.13)
The values for a0, b0, c, km and kp are now chosen as, −1, −5, −10000,
0.01, 0.1 respectively.
Suppose that the plant suffers damage which results in
Θ =
−0.4 0
0 −0.1
 (6.2.14)
Therefore, there is a 40% reduction in damping and a 10% reduction in control
authority.
From figure 6.1 it can be seen that simply applying the theory from [54]
when the estimator is not a fixed entity leads to incomplete results. In [54] the
estimator is considered fixed, and the detector dynamics is amused to be unity.
It should be noted that when referring to gain in terms of an optimisation
plot, this document is referring to maxL
(
‖Phηh (Θ,L)‖∞
‖Prd0 (L)‖2
)
. The results obtained
suggest that the best estimator is the open-loop case, and that the optimal
excitation frequency is 0 rad.s−1. This would lead to an infinite detection time,
which is most certainly not optimal. Furthermore, this shows that ignoring the
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Figure 6.2: AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth. ωLopt is
given by peak of ‖Phη(Θ,L)‖∞‖Prd0 (L)‖2 .
detector dynamics may potentially lead to unexceptionably large optimisation
errors.
6.3 Example 2: Basic SISO Application
Example 1 is now repeated for the Optimal AFD problem, using the augmented
theory described in this dissertation where detector dynamics are also taken
into consideration.
This example uses the same model as in example 1, and the model is
therefore not restated here.
Now, using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot can be
easily produced showing the AFD performance as a function of the estimator
bandwidth. The results are shown in figure 6.2. From this figure it is easy to
determine the optimal estimator bandwidth as
ωLopt = 0.0455 rad.s−1 (6.3.1)
when a targeted detection time of 10s is used.
Finally, with ωLopt known, a plot of Phη(Lopt) can be produced. The result
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Figure 6.3: Magnitude response of Phη(Lopt). The optimal excitation frequency
(ωηopt) is given by the peak of the magnitude response.
is shown in figure 6.3. From the figure the optimal excitation frequency is
ωηopt = 0.1365 rad.s−1 (6.3.2)
When compared with the results in the first example, it can be seen that a
non-trivial solution is realised. The resulting estimator is no longer open-loop,
and the excitation is not a constant input.
These results are used to set up a simulation of the optimal AFD system.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.4 for moderate levels of white
noise and in Figure 6.5 for high levels of white noise. Note that the setup proves
robust against white noise, while providing a substantial gain from error signal
to residual output. As can be seen the detection time is above the minimum
targeted detection time, and would not be adversely affected by the detector
dynamics.
It is important to note that model inaccuracies are a major hurdle to effec-
tive fault detection. Parametric uncertainties are mathematically identical to
faulty parameters, and therefore much effort should be spent in determining
accurate system models. Notwithstanding this, there are a number of steps
that can be taken in order to deal with parameter uncertainties. These include
employing the system as part of an active fault tolerant control system and/or
using a leaky detector.
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Figure 6.4: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 186 seconds and is detected 13 seconds later. In the
detector output both the positive and negative part of the two-sided CUSUM
detector is shown. Note that each time the threshold is reached the detector
is reset, and the trigger value is set to one for a single sample period.
6.4 Example 3: Zero-Disturbance AFD Using
Input Cancellation
This simple example demonstrates using control cancellation to achieve zero-
disturbance AFD. Since the auxiliary signal is within the kernel of the system
input, only actuator fault detection can be performed.
A simple first order MIMO system can be captured by the following state
space representation:
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b1 b2
]
u y =
[
1
]
x (6.4.1)
Consider the following fault model
b1 = b10 (1 + θb1) b2 = b20 (1 + θb2) (6.4.2)
where θb1 and θb2 are zero in the nominal case.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 67
Figure 6.5: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct ratio.
Failure occurs at 186 seconds and is detected 20 seconds later. Note that each
time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value is set
to one for a single sample period.
Using an upper linear fractional transform, the system can be written as
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b10 b20
]
w +
[
b10 b20
]
u (6.4.3)
z =
[
0
]
x+
1
1
u (6.4.4)
y = [1]x (6.4.5)
with
w =
θb1 0
0 θb2
 z (6.4.6)
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. Again, the model introduced
at the start of this chapter will be used.
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Figure 6.6: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 5 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
Figure 6.7: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct ratio.
Failure occurs at 186 seconds and is detected 7 seconds later. Note that each
time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value is set
to one for a single sample period.
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Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model: x˙
x˙n
 =
a 0
0 c
 x
xn
+
b10 b20
0 0
w +
b10 b20
0 0
u
+
kP
−c
 d (6.4.7)
z =
0 0
0 0
 x
xn
+
1 0
0 1
u (6.4.8)
y =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.4.9)
e =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.4.10)
The values for a, b10 , b20 , c, km, and kp are now chosen as, −1, −5, −2,
−10000, 0.01, 0.1 respectively.
Suppose that the plant suffers damage which results in
Θ =
−0.4 0
0 −0.1
 (6.4.11)
Therefore, there is a 40% reduction in b1 and 10% reduction in b2 control
authority.
Now, using a similar process as in [81] and example 2 and a targeted
detection time of 10s, it is found that the optimal estimator bandwidth is
0.0464 rad.s−1, while the optimal excitation frequency is 0.1489 rad.s−1.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.6 for moderate levels of white
noise and in Figure 6.7 for high levels of white noise. From this simulation it
can be seen that no additional disturbance is visible in the nominal system,
while a large residual is generated in the faulty system.
Note that the setup proves robust against white noise, while providing a
substantial gain from error signal to residual output. It is also noted that since
the detection time falls below the targeted minimum, the detector dynamics
may have adversely affected performance. Therefore, the detection could be
performed faster when a smaller td is used. This would however reduce detec-
tion performance for small faults.
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Figure 6.8: The output zeroing states. Note that both the system states are
non-zero.
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Figure 6.9: Although there is a non-zero input and non-zero states, the result-
ing output is zero.
6.5 Example 4: Zero-Disturbance AFD Using
Output Cancellation
This simple example demonstrates using the output cancellation theory to
design an appropriate input shaping filter.
A simple generic second order system can be represented by the following
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state-space model:
x˙ =
a11 a12
a21 a22
x+
b11 b12
b21 b22
u (6.5.1)
y =
[
c11 c12
]
x+
[
d11 d12
]
u (6.5.2)
The values for a11, a12, a21, a22, b11, b12, b21, b22, c11, c12, d11, d12 are chosen
as 2, −1, 0, −1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0.5, −1 respectively.
The system given above is proper with D of full row rank, therefore equa-
tion 3.2.10 applies. Now, assuming that the error output is equal to the system
output, the input shaping filter is given by,
x˙η =
−2.4 −1.8
0.4 −0.2
xη +
1 0
1 1
 aH0ηh
η =
−0.4 −0.8
0.8 1.6
xη +
1 0
0 1
 aH0ηh (6.5.3)
where H0 is a base matrix for the kernel of the system matrix Deu, given that
e = y. Therefore, H0ηh ∈
[
0.8944 0.4472
]T
.
With reference to figure 6.8 and 6.9, it can be seen that the auxiliary input
excites both system states, but has no impact on the system output. In the
case of a faulty system the provided excitation is no longer contained within
the kernel of Deu, providing a residual signal for fault detection. This input
shaping filter forms the basis of the MIMO output cancellation scheme.
From this point onwards, the design procedure to follow is identical to that
of example 3, and is therefore not restated here.
6.6 Example 5: Worst-Case vs Average-Case
Optimisation
This simple example demonstrates the difference between using a worst-case
or average-case optimisation. It is specifically designed to illustrate the loss
of detection performance when the latter is selected while no control input is
present.
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Figure 6.10: AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth. The
optimisation is performed for the H∞ as well H2 optimisation criteria from
the auxiliary input and control input respectively.
A simple first order MIMO system can be captured by the following state
space representation:
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b1 b2
]
u y =
[
1
]
x (6.6.1)
Consider the following fault model:
b1 = b10 (1 + θb1) b2 = b20 (1 + θb2) (6.6.2)
where θb1 and θb2 are zero in the nominal case.
Using an upper linear fractional transform, the system can be written as:
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b10 b20
]
w +
[
b10 b20
]
u (6.6.3)
z =
[
0
]
x+
1
1
u (6.6.4)
y = [1]x (6.6.5)
with
w =
θb1 0
0 θb2
 z (6.6.6)
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Next, the disturbance model is introduced. As before, the model introduced
at the start of this chapter will be used.
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model: x˙
x˙n
 =
a 0
0 c
 x
xn
+
b10 b20
0 0
w +
b10 b20
0 0
u
+
kP
−c
 d (6.6.7)
z =
0 0
0 0
 x
xn
+
1 0
0 1
u (6.6.8)
y =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.6.9)
e =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.6.10)
The parameters given above are now chosen as follows: a = −50, b10 = −5,
b20 = −2, c = −100000, km = 0.002, and kp = 0.5.
Assume that the plant is typically controlled by relatively low bandwidth
control inputs. The control power may be modelled as a simple low-pass filter
given by
Hu =
a3u/ (s+ au)3
a3u/ (s+ au)
3
 (6.6.11)
with au = 0.1.
The plant fault dynamics are excited by an auxiliary signal injected into
the system control null-space
η = aHη0ηh = 0.1
−0.3714
0.9285
 ηh (6.6.12)
Now, suppose that the plant suffers damage which results in
Θ =
−0.75 0
0 0
 (6.6.13)
Therefore, there is a 75% reduction in the b1 control authority.
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Figure 6.11: Simulation results for the H∞ case with a large amount of noise
in the correct ratio. Failure occurs at 186 seconds and is detected 1.7 seconds
later. Note that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and
the trigger value is set to one for a single sample period.
Using the equations derived in this work, the AFD performance as a func-
tion of the estimator bandwidth can be determined. The optimisation is per-
formed for both the worst-case (H∞ optimisation), as well as the average-case
(H2 optimisation). The results are shown in figure 6.10. From this figure it is
easy to determine the optimal estimator bandwidth and gain as
ωLopt = 1.526 rad.s−1 Lopt = 48.474 (6.6.14)
for the H∞ optimisation, and
ωLopt = 0.1207 rad.s−1 Lopt = 49.879 (6.6.15)
for the H2 optimisation.
With Lopt known, Phη(Lopt) can be can be determined, as
ωηopt = 3.3419 rad.s−1 ηmax = 2.389 (6.6.16)
for the H∞ optimisation, and
ωηopt = 2.4683 rad.s−1 ηmax = 2.748 (6.6.17)
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Figure 6.12: Simulation results for the H2 with a large amount of noise in the
correct ratio. Failure occurs at 50 seconds and is detected 2 seconds later.
Note that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the
trigger value is set to one for a single sample period.
for the H2 optimisation, where the maximum excitation induced disturbance
is taken as 0.1.
It is now possible to determine a reasonable trip threshold for the detector.
From the calculations above, the noise power as a function of the estimator
bandwidth is known. For simplicity the detector threshold (hT ) is simply
selected as 100 times the noise power prior to a failure, and is given by
Prd0 = 0.5647 hT = 56.47 (6.6.18)
for the H∞ optimisation, and
Prd0 = 1.301 hT = 130.1 (6.6.19)
for the H2 optimisation.
These results are used to set up a simulation of both optimal AFD sys-
tem. The simulation results for the worst-case as well as for the average-case
optimisations are shown in Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 respectively. Note
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that in both cases it can be seen that the H2 optimisation results in a small
reduction in the worst-case detection performance when compared to the H∞
optimisation.
6.7 Example 6: Basic SISO Closed Loop
Application
This example will demonstrate the application of the proposed AFD framework
to a simple closed-loop SISO system using the technique proposed in section
5.4. It is shown that the open-loop framework can easily be adapted for use in
closed-loop systems. The open-loop case is first considered, and then a simple
control loop is closed around the system.
In general, a first order linear differential equation is given by the following
equation:
x˙ = ax+ bu (6.7.1)
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Figure 6.13: AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth. ωLopt is
given by peak of ‖Phη(Θ,L)‖∞‖Prd0 (L)‖2 .
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Figure 6.14: Magnitude response of Phη(Lopt). The optimal excitation fre-
quency (ωηopt) is given by the peak of the magnitude response.
This can be represented by the following state space representation.
x˙ =
[
a
]
x+
[
b
]
u (6.7.2)
y =
[
1
]
x (6.7.3)
Consider the following fault model:
a = a0 (1 + θa) (6.7.4)
b = b0 (1 + θb) (6.7.5)
where θa and θb are zero in the nominal case.
Using an upper linear fractional transform, the system can be written as
x˙ =
[
a0
]
x+
[
a0 b0
]
w +
[
b0
]
u (6.7.6)
z =
1
0
x+
0
1
u (6.7.7)
y = [1]x (6.7.8)
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Figure 6.15: Simulation results of the open-loop system without any added
noise. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 12 seconds later. Note
that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger
value is set to one for a single sample period.
with
w =
θa 0
0 θb
 z (6.7.9)
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. In this example, the model
introduced at the start of this chapter will be used.
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Figure 6.16: Simulation results of the open-loop system with added noise.
Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 8 seconds later. Note that each
time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value is set
to one for a single sample period.
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model: x˙
x˙n
 =
a0 0
0 c
 x
xn
+
a0 b0
0 0
w
+
b
0
u+
kP
−c
 d (6.7.10)
z =
1 0
0 0
 x
xn
+
0
1
u (6.7.11)
y =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.7.12)
e =
[
1 km
]  x
xn
 (6.7.13)
The values for a0, b0, c, km and kp are now chosen as −1, −5, −10000,
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Figure 6.17: Simulation results of the closed-loop system without any added
noise. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 11 seconds later. Note
that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger
value is set to one for a single sample period.
0.005 and 0.1 respectively.
Suppose that the plant suffers damage which results in
Θ =
−0.4 0
0 −0.1
 (6.7.14)
Therefore, there is a 40% reduction in damping and a 10% reduction in control
authority.
Now, using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot can easily
be produced showing the AFD performance as a function of the estimator
bandwidth. The results are shown in figure 6.13. From this figure it is easy to
determine the optimal estimator bandwidth as
ωLopt = 0.2812 rad.s−1 (6.7.15)
when a targeted detection time of 1s is used.
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Figure 6.18: Simulation results of the closed-loop system with added noise.
Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 16 seconds later. Note that each
time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value is set
to one for a single sample period.
Finally, with ωLopt known, a plot of Phη(Lopt) can be produced. The result
is shown in figure 6.14. From the figure the optimal excitation frequency is
ωηopt = 1.3518 rad.s−1 (6.7.16)
These results are used to set up a simulation of the optimal open-loop AFD
system. The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.15 without added white
noise and in Figure 6.16 with white noise added.
Now, a full state feedback controller is added by applying the following
control law,
u = −kx+ kixi (6.7.17)
where the system state vector is augmented with an integrator state xi.
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Figure 6.19: Simulation results of the closed-loop system without any added
noise, while a reference input is provided. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and
is detected 11 seconds later. Note that each time the threshold is reached the
detector is reset, and the trigger value is set to one for a single sample period.
Therefore, the closed-loop system is given by x˙
x˙i
 =
a− bk bki
−c 0
x
xi
+
0
1
 r (6.7.18)
Now, design the gain Kˆ = [k ki] so that the closed loop poles of equa-
tion (6.7.18) are at [−5± 5j]. Using standard pole placement techniques, the
associated gain is calculated as
Kˆ = [−1.8 10] (6.7.19)
Now, from equation 5.4.3
∆max =
|P (0)eηclηcl|
|P (Θ1)eηolηol|
= 10.96 = 1.04 (6.7.20)
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Figure 6.20: Simulation results of the closed-loop system with added noise,
while a reference input is provided. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is
detected 16 seconds later. Note that each time the threshold is reached the
detector is reset, and the trigger value is set to one for a single sample period.
it can be seen that a small 4% increase in detection signal is expected.
These results are used to repeat the previously performed simulation for
the closed-loop AFD system. The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.17
without added white noise and in Figure 6.18 with white noise added.
When comparing Figures 6.15 and 6.17 the following is noted:
• The closed-loop detection time has improved slightly from the open-loop
case.
• This slight increase in performance is due to the slight increase in the
post-failure excitation signal due to the controller rejecting the system
fault.
Finally, the closed-loop is repeated while providing a reference input to
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the controller. The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.19 without added
white noise and in Figure 6.20 with white noise added.
From Figure 6.19 and 6.20 it is clearly visible the the system is still effec-
tively tracing the reference input. Furthermore, it can be clearly seen that the
fault is detected nearly instantly as soon as a control input is provided.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter a number of examples are used to demonstrate the various
aspects of the proposed AFD framework. The following was demonstrated:
• Example 1: This is a open-loop SISO example without considering the
effect of the detector dynamics. The results show that doing this causes
the result to be unreasonably inaccurate, or that the optimisation often
degrades to the trivial case.
• Example 2: This is a open-loop SISO example using the same model as
example 1. In this case the detector dynamics are also considered, avoid-
ing the trivial solution and resulting in a far more realistic optimisation
solution. It further shows that the targeted detection time places a soft
lower bound on the optimisation result.
• Example 3: In the example the application of the zero-disturbance AFD
framework using the input cancellation technique is demonstrated. It
is shown how to design the input shaping filter, thereby injecting the
excitation into the system null-space. It is shown that no disturbance
in the nominal system is present, while still providing fast post-failure
actuator fault detection.
• Example 4: This example demonstrates the application of the zero-
disturbance AFD framework using the output cancellation technique.
The example focuses on the design of the required input shaping filter.
• Example 5: In this example the worst-case versus the average-case opti-
misation is demonstrated. The same example is performed for both op-
timisation goals, and the performance differences illustrated. It is found
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that when no control input is present, a small performance reduction is
visible when optimising for the average-case.
• Example 6: This is a closed-loop SISO example using the same model
as example 1 and 2. This example demonstrates the application of the
open-loop AFD framework to closed loop systems. It is shown how to
adapt the open-loop solution to the closed-loop system. Furthermore,
it is demonstrated that effective AFD can be achieved in closed-loop
systems.
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Chapter 7
Active Fault Detection for a
Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
In this chapter, the theory developed in the previous chapters is applied to a
larger, more realistic problem. As a case study an active fault detection system
is developed for a small unmanned aerial vehicle. It is, however, important
to bear in mind that this case study is still treated in an abstract manner.
Several assumptions will be made in order to keep the problem informative
and concise. However, these assumptions may not necessarily be practical. It
is for this reason that the physical parameters and units are not discussed.
Before developing the AFD system, the vehicle dynamics are briefly intro-
duced. The AFD system is then first designed around a simplified decoupled
dynamics model, and then redesigned for the full lateral dynamics model.
7.1 Architecture for Active Fault Tolerant
Control of an UAV
In this section, a simple yet flexible control system architecture is proposed.
This architectural design is done at an abstract level, and therefore the devel-
oped architecture is not aircraft or implementation specific.
This section starts by introducing a number of important design consid-
erations which are to be addressed by the proposed architecture. Following
this, the controller architecture is discussed in abstract terms. It is important
87
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to note that this section is included only to provide some context, and that
the controller architecture is not a focus of this research. Furthermore, if the
reader is well versed in the topics discussed here, this section may be skipped.
7.1.1 Background
During the early days of aviation, aircraft required constant input from the
pilot in order to maintain stability. As the range of aircraft increased over
the years, pilots started to suffer from severe fatigue. Early autopilots were
therefore developed in order to lighten the workload on pilots during longer
flights. The first of these early autopilots was demonstrated during the 1914
Paris aircraft safety competition [82]. This simple mechanical autopilot was
able to keep the aircraft flying straight and level without constant pilot input,
therefore significantly reducing the pilot’s workload.
With the advent of small yet powerful digital computers, autopilot tech-
nology started to progress rapidly. Today we have autopilot systems which are
able to take off, navigate an assigned course, and then land at the end of the
flight.
There s however a difference between a human pilot and a classical flight
control system. When a survivable fault or failure occurs on a piloted aircraft,
the experienced pilot requires only a few moments in order to adjust his or
her inputs to the aircraft’s now reduced capabilities. On the other hand, a
classical autopilot makes no adjustments to the control law it is using. This
rigid approach can lead to severe performance reductions, or even the complete
loss of the vehicle.
One way to increase the reliability of a control system is by employing Ac-
tive Fault Tolerant Control (AFTC). The basic idea is to develop an autopilot
which is able to handle failures in a similar or superior manner to the human
pilot. This type of autopilot is considerably more complex than a standard
one, as it requires a number of complex subsystems to work together in a
coherent manner. These subsystems include: a robust, yet fast, fault detec-
tion and diagnosis (FDD) algorithm; a reconfigurable inner-loop controller; a
reconfigurable guidance system; as well as a reconfigurable navigation system.
AFTC involves the control system responding to faults by actively altering
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the control law. To be able to do this efficiently, faults must be detected in a
reliable and timely manner. Fault detection schemes can be classified as either
passive or active fault detection. For a brief discussion of many AFTC related
topics please refer to [34] and [83]. AFTC has been applied to a number of
practical problems, for example, a detailed study on applying AFTC to small
unmanned aerial vehicles was conducted in [84].
7.1.2 Important Design Considerations
The following important considerations must be suitably addressed by the
controller architecture:
• The design must be flexible enough to deal with conventional as well as
unconventional flight controllers.
• The ability to accommodate unconventional controllers should not sub-
stantially complicate the implementation of conventional controllers.
• It is advantageous to allow for a step-wise or partial implementation.
For example, all subsystems up to the level of the inner-loop controller
is reconfigurable, while guidance and navigation is not.
7.1.3 Conceptual System Overview
Figure 7.1 provides a high level overview of the proposed architecture.
With reference to this figure, the AFTC system is composed of a supervisor,
a human operator interface, and four controller nodes. The controller nodes
include a reconfigurable navigation system; a reconfigurable guidance system;
a reconfigurable inner-loop controller; and finally, a virtual aircraft.
This architecture provides each controller node with two communication
paths. These are:
• Simple direct communication with the nodes directly adjacent to it in
the controller loop. This is equivalent to what is found in most non-
reconfigurable flight control systems.
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Figure 7.1: System Overview
• Advanced communication via a supervisor request system. This allows
for signal injection at any point in the control loop. This route is used
to perform all reconfiguration management.
7.1.4 Supervisor
The supervisor is primarily responsible for managing the AFTC system. Some
of this subsystem’s responsibilities include:
• Making system-wide decisions.
• Providing a system for control and diagnostic signal injection.
• Managing the post fault reconfiguration process.
• Monitoring the health of the various subsystems.
• Providing the operator with easily understandable information.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION FOR A SMALL UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLE 91
Figure 7.2: Virtual Aircraft
Finally, it is important to note that the supervisor is the only node with the
ability to monitor as well as override all major signals and parameters within
the system.
7.1.5 Virtual Aircraft
The virtual aircraft encapsulates the physical aircraft under control of the
AFT control system. The primary purpose of this block is to provide the best
possible, idealised aircraft to the rest of the system. It receives virtual actuator
commands from the inner loop controller and provides the rest of the system
with virtual sensor readings (aircraft state estimates).
With reference to figure 7.2, this subsystem consists out of four blocks.
They are: an FDD system; an actuator virtualisation block; a sensor virtu-
alisation block; and the physical aircraft. Each of these are now discussed in
more detail.
7.1.5.1 Fault Detection and Diagnosis System
The FDD system is responsible for detecting and diagnosing aircraft failures.
These failures may include control surface, structural damage, or sensor faults.
When a fault occurs, the FDD system performs the following functions:
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• Detecting that a fault has occurred in the minimum possible time. This
is the primary focus of the research presented in this dissertation.
• Calculation of a new physical aircraft model.
• Triggering the reconfiguration of the virtual aircraft.
• Calculation of a new virtual aircraft model if the pre-fault virtual aircraft
model could not be maintained.
• Informing the supervisor about the fault, as well as providing the new
virtual aircraft model if applicable.
7.1.5.2 Actuator Virtualisation
This block is responsible for mapping the virtual actuator commands to suit-
able physical commands. When an actuator fault occurs, this block is informed
about it by the FDD system, and provided with new physical aircraft data.
The mapping is then recalculated in order to provide the best possible virtual
aircraft model.
7.1.5.3 Sensor Virtualisation
This block is responsible for producing the vehicle state estimates. When a
sensor fault occurs, this block is responsible for managing this in an effective
manner1.
7.1.5.4 Physical Aircraft
This block represents the actual aircraft or aircraft model under control. This
block receives physical actuator commands from the actuator virtualisation
block and provides the sensor virtualisation block with raw sensor readings.
1As it is in general far easier to provide hardware sensor redundancy, this is currently
not a research priority.
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Figure 7.3: Reconfigurable Inner-Loop Controller
7.1.6 Reconfigurable Control System
The reconfigurable inner-loop controller is responsible for generating the vir-
tual actuator commands from reference commands received from the guidance
controller. Figure 7.4 depicts this system schematically.
With reference to figure 7.3, this system consists of two subsystems: an
inner-loop controller reconfiguration system; and a parameterised inner-loop
controller.
7.1.7 Reconfigurable Guidance System
The reconfigurable guidance system or outer-loop controller is responsible for
providing the control system with achievable reference commands from refer-
ence commands provided by the navigation system. Figure 7.4 depicts this
system schematically.
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Figure 7.4: Reconfigurable Outer-Loop or Guidance Controller
With reference to figure 7.4, this system consists out of two subsystems: an
outer-loop controller reconfiguration system; and a parameterised outer-loop
controller.
7.1.8 Reconfigurable Navigation System
The reconfigurable navigation system is responsible for providing the guidance
system with appropriate reference commands in order to follow the desired
flight plan. In other words, the navigation system provides the guidance system
with, for example, the required altitude and heading. Figure 7.5 depicts this
system schematically.
With reference to figure 7.5, this system consists out of two subsystems: a
navigation reconfiguration system; and a parameterised navigation system.
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Figure 7.5: Reconfigurable Navigation System
7.2 Vehicle and Operational Definitions
In this section the vehicle parameters as well as the vehicle operating conditions
are defined.
7.2.1 Operating Condition
The vehicle operating condition is given by:
ρ = 1.2 (7.2.1)
where ρ is the air density,
V¯0 = 22 (7.2.2)
is the vehicle trim velocity, and
q = 12ρV¯0
2 (7.2.3)
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is the dynamic pressure.
7.2.2 Vehicle Actuator Definition
The Modular UAV has a large number of independent aerodynamic actuators.
These are defined as follows:
• One aileron is mounted on each of the wings. Define the left and right
aileron deflection angles, δAl and δAr respectively, such that a positive
deflection induces a negative rolling moment.
• One flap is mounted on each of the wings. Define the left and right flap
deflection angles, δFl and δFr respectively, such that a positive deflection
induces an increase in lift.
• A split elevator is mounted at the rear of the UAV. Define the left and
right elevator deflection angles, δEl and δEr respectively, such that a
positive deflection induces a negative pitching moment.
• One rudder is mounted on each of the two vertical tails. Define the left
and right rudder deflection angles, δRl and δRr respectively, such that a
positive deflection induces a negative yawing moment.
Now, define the aerodynamic control vector as,
cA = [δAl δAr δFl δFr δEl δEr δRl δRr ]
T (7.2.4)
Alternatively, the control vector can be defined in terms of lumped actuators
as,
cA = [δA δF δE δR]T (7.2.5)
where δX = δXl = δXr .
7.3 AFD Based on Simplified Dynamics
In this section, active fault detection is applied to simplified decoupled aircraft
dynamics models. These models are based on the research presented in [18]
and [22]. These models are further simplified by removing the effect of weak
secondary control surfaces.
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7.3.1 Roll Dynamics AFD
An AFD system is derived for the decoupled roll dynamics.
7.3.1.1 Linear Roll Dynamics
The roll dynamics is given by the following state space representation [22].
P˙ =
[
L¯p
Ixx
]
P +
[
L¯δA
Ixx
]
δA (7.3.1)
Pw =
[
1
]
P (7.3.2)
where,
LP = qSCL¯P
b
2V¯0
L¯δA = qSbClδA (7.3.3)
7.3.1.2 Scheme Selection
The simplified roll dynamics are governed by a SISO model. Following the
selection process shown in Figure 5.1, the simplified SISO framework must
be selected. This further implies that the solution will impose an additional
nominal performance and disturbance penalty. Since aeronautical applications
are in general safety critical, the worst-case optimisation will be performed.
7.3.1.3 The Fault Model
Consider the following fault model:
L¯P = L¯P0
(
1 + θL¯P
)
L¯δA = L¯δA0
(
1 + θL¯δA
)
(7.3.4)
where, θL¯P and θL¯δA are zero in the nominal case.
Using an upper linear fractional transform the system can be written as
P˙ =
[
L¯P0
Ixx
]
P +
[
L¯P0
Ixx
L¯δA0
Ixx
]
w +
[
L¯δA0
Ixx
]
δA (7.3.5)
z =
1
0
P +
0
1
 δA (7.3.6)
Pw = [1]P (7.3.7)
with,
w =
θL¯P 0
0 θL¯δA
 z (7.3.8)
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7.3.1.4 The Disturbance Model
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. In this example the disturbance
model from chapter 6 is again used. It is briefly restated here.
• Zero mean white process noise which enters the system in the same
manner as the control input
• Bandwidth limited zero mean white measurement noise
• The error signal is equal to the plant output
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model:
 P˙
x˙n
 =
 L¯P0Ixx 0
0 c
P
xn
+
 L¯P0Ixx L¯δA0Ixx
0 0

w1
w2

+
 L¯δA0Ixx
0
 δA +
kP
−c
 d (7.3.9)
z1
z2
 =
1 0
0 0
P
xn
+
0
1
 δA (7.3.10)
Pw =
[
1 km
] P
xn
 (7.3.11)
e =
[
1 km
] P
xn
 (7.3.12)
The values for vehicle parameters are provided in Appendix A.
7.3.1.5 Solution Synthesis and Results
Suppose that the UAV suffers damage to a wing, resulting in the following
fault case
Θ =
−0.1 0
0 −0.5
 (7.3.13)
Therefore, the damage results in a 10% reduction in damping and a 50%
reduction in roll control authority.
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Figure 7.6: Roll AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth as
well as excitation frequency. As before, the optimisation is performed for a
targeted detection time of 1s.
It is considered acceptable to penalise fault detection times of below one
second. Therefore, the targeted detection time as chosen as
td = 1s (7.3.14)
Furthermore, the following noise model parameters are used,
c = −10000 km = 0.01 kp = 0.1 (7.3.15)
Using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot can be easily
produced showing the AFD performance as a function of the estimator band-
width and auxiliary excitation frequency. The results are shown in Figure 7.6.
Alternatively, the optimal solution can be represented using separate estima-
tor bandwidth and auxiliary excitation frequency related plots. The results
are shown in Figures 7.7 and 7.8.
From these figures or using the solution method shown in Figure 5.3 it is
possible to determine the optimal estimator bandwidth and estimator gain as
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Figure 7.7: Roll AFD performance as a function of estimator bandwidth for a
targeted detection time of 1s.
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Figure 7.8: Roll AFD performance as a function of excitation frequency for a
targeted detection time of 1s and at the optimal estimator bandwidth.
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ωLopt = 0.2812 rad.s−1 Lopt =
[
5.4393 0
]T
(7.3.16)
and, the optimal excitation frequency as
ωηopt = 1.4204 rad.s−1 (7.3.17)
7.3.2 Lateral Acceleration AFD
Next, an AFD system is derived for the decoupled lateral aircraft dynamics.
7.3.2.1 Linear Lateral Acceleration Dynamics
The directional dynamics are given by the following state space representation
[22]. β˙
R˙
 =
 YβmV¯0 −1
N¯β
Izz
N¯R
Izz
 β
R
+
 YδRmV¯0 YδAmV¯0¯NδR
Izz
¯NδA
Izz
δR
δA
 (7.3.18)
BW =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
]  β
R
+ [YδR
m
YδA
m
] δR
δA
 (7.3.19)
where,
Yβ = qSCYβ YR = qS
b
2V¯0
CYr
N¯β = qSbCNβ N¯R = qSb
b
2V¯0
CNr
YδR = qSCYδR YδA = qSCYδA
N¯δR = qSbC ¯NδR N¯δA = qSbC ¯NδA (7.3.20)
For best results, each control surface should be considered independently
rather than lumped units. However, this is not done here in order to keep the
model as simple and concise as possible.
7.3.2.2 Scheme Selection
The lateral dynamics are given by a proper MIMO system, were Deu is a ma-
trix of full row-rank. Following the selection process shown in Figure 5.1, the
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output-cancellation MIMO framework may be selected. This further implies
that the solution will not impose an additional nominal performance and dis-
turbance penalty. As was stated previously the worst-case optimisation will
be performed.
7.3.2.3 The Fault Model
At first glance it would seem that a seven parameter fault model is required.
However, considering that Yβ, YR, and YδR are physically related to N¯β, N¯R,
and N¯δR any change in the one parameter will also be visible in the other
parameter. Therefore, consider the following four parameter fault model:
N¯β = N¯β0
(
1 + θN¯β
)
N¯R = N¯R0
(
1 + θN¯R
)
N¯δR = ¯NδR0
(
1 + θ ¯NδR
)
N¯δA = ¯NδA0
(
1 + θ ¯NδA
)
where, θN¯β , θN¯R , θ ¯NδR , and θ ¯NδA are all zero in the nominal case.
It should be noted that a change will also occur here in the parameters
that are being ignored. Therefore, the exact fault condition modelled here is
not physically attainable. Real faults will however be detected.
Using an upper linear fractional transform the system can be written as
β˙
R˙
 =
 YβmV¯0 −1
N¯β0
Izz
¯NR0
Izz
 β
R
+
 0 0 0 0
N¯β0
Izz
¯NR0
Izz
¯NδR0
Izz
¯NδA0
Izz
w
+
 YδRmV¯0 YδAmV¯0¯NδR0
Izz
¯NδA0
Izz

δR
δA
 (7.3.21)
z =

1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0

 β
R
+

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

δR
δA
 (7.3.22)
BW =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
]  β
R
+ [YδR
m
YδA
m
] δR
δA
 (7.3.23)
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with,
w =

θN¯β 0 0 0
0 θN¯R 0 0
0 0 θ ¯NδR 0
0 0 0 θ ¯NδA
 z (7.3.24)
7.3.2.4 The Disturbance Model
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. The same fault model used previ-
ously is again assumed here.
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model:
β˙
R˙
x˙n
 =

Yβ
mV¯0
−1 0
N¯β0
Izz
¯NR0
Izz
0
0 0 c


β
R
xn
+

0 0 0 0
N¯β0
Izz
¯NR0
Izz
¯NδR0
Izz
¯NδA0
Izz
0 0 0 0
w
+

YδR
mV¯0
YδA
mV¯0¯NδR0
Izz
¯NδA0
Izz
0 0

δR
δA
+

0
kP
−c
 d (7.3.25)
z =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0


β
R
xn
+

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

δR
δA
 (7.3.26)
BW =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
km
] 
β
R
xn
+ [YδRm YδAm ]
δR
δA
 (7.3.27)
e =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
km
] 
β
R
xn
+ [YδRm YδAm ]
δR
δA
 (7.3.28)
The values for the model parameters are provided in Appendix A.
7.3.2.5 Solution Synthesis and Results
Since the lateral acceleration model given is proper with Deu of full row rank,
equation 3.2.10 applies. Now, given that the error output is equal to the system
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Figure 7.9: The auxiliary excitation signal. Note that both the ailerons and
rudders are excited.
output, the input shaping filter is given by,
x˙η = (A−BuD+euCe)xη +BuaHη0ηh
=
−0.1281 −1
101.1 −0.9454
xη +
0.1579 −0.01433
−8.809 1.468
 aH0ηh
η = −D+euCexη + IaHη0ηh
=
 0.9816 0
−0.08907 0
xη +
1 0
0 1
 aH0ηh (7.3.29)
whereH0 is a base matrix for the kernel ofDeu. Therefore,H0ηh ∈
[
0.0904 0.9959
]T
.
From this input shaping filter it can be seen that due to the large variation
in lateral actuator effectiveness, the required excitation mix is likely not prac-
tical. This problem will be addressed when implementing AFD for the full
combined lateral acceleration and roll model.
With reference to figures 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11 it can be seen that the auxiliary
input excites both actuators and system states, but has no meaningful impact
on the system output.
Suppose that the UAV suffers damage to its tail section, resulting in the
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Figure 7.10: The output zeroing states. Note that both the yaw rate and
side-slip angle are non-zero.
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Figure 7.11: Although there is a non-zero input and non-zero states, the re-
sulting output is zero.
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Figure 7.12: Lateral Acceleration AFD performance as a function of estimator
bandwidth as well as excitation frequency. As before, the optimisation is
performed for a targeted detection time of 1s.
following fault case
Θ =

0 0 0 0
0 −0.2 0 0
0 0 −0.1 0
0 0 0 0
 (7.3.30)
Therefore, the damage results in a 20% reduction in yaw rate damping and a
10% reduction in the rudder’s yaw control authority.
It is considered acceptable to penalise fault detection times of below one
second. Therefore, the targeted detection time is chosen as
td = 1s (7.3.31)
Furthermore, the following noise model parameters are used,
c = −10000 km = 0.01 kp = 0.1 (7.3.32)
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Figure 7.13: Lateral Acceleration AFD performance as a function of estimator
bandwidth for a targeted detection time of 1s.
Using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot can be easily
produced showing the AFD performance as a function of the estimator band-
width and auxiliary excitation frequency. The results are shown in figure 7.12.
Alternatively, the optimal solution can be represented using separate estima-
tor bandwidth and auxiliary excitation frequency related plots. The results
are shown in Figure 7.13 and 7.14.
From these figures or using the solution method shown in Figure 5.3 it is
possible to determine the optimal estimator bandwidth and gain as
ωLopt = 0.9103 rad.s−1 Lopt =
[
0.8277 2.8593 0
]T
(7.3.33)
and, the optimal excitation frequency as
ωηopt = 1.0422 rad.s−1 (7.3.34)
7.3.3 Normal Acceleration AFD
Finally, an AFD system is now derived for the decoupled normal acceleration
aircraft dynamics.
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Figure 7.14: Lateral Acceleration AFD performance as a function of excitation
frequency for a targeted detection time of 1s and at the optimal estimator
bandwidth.
7.3.3.1 Linearised Normal Acceleration Dynamics
The longitudinal dynamics can be given by the following state space represen-
tation [22]. α˙
Q˙
 =
−LαmV¯ 1−LQmV¯0
Mα
Iyy
MQ
Iyy
α
Q
+
 0
MδE
Iyy
 δE (7.3.35)
CW =
[
−Lα
m
0
] α
Q
 (7.3.36)
where,
Lα = qSCLα LQ = qSCLq
c¯
2V¯0
Mα = qSc¯CMα MQ = qSc¯CMq
c¯
2V¯0
MδE = qSc¯CMδE (7.3.37)
For best results, each control surface should be considered independently.
However, this is not done here in order to keep the model as simple and concise
as possible.
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7.3.3.2 Scheme Selection
The normal acceleration dynamics are governed by a SISO model. Following
the selection process shown in Figure 5.1, the simplified SISO framework must
be selected. This further implies that the solution will impose an additional
nominal performance and disturbance penalty. As was stated previously the
worst-case optimisation will be performed.
7.3.3.3 The Fault Model
At first glance it would seem that a five parameter fault model is required.
However, considering that Lα and LQ are physically related to Mα and MQ,
any change in the one parameter will also be visible in the other parameter.
Therefore, consider the following three parameter fault model:
Mα = Mα0 (1 + θMα) MQ = MQ0
(
1 + θMQ
)
MδE = MδE0
(
1 + θMδE
)
(7.3.38)
where, θMα , θMQ and θMδE are zero in the nominal case.
As before this assumption is made to keep the example informative. Again,
it should be noted that a change will also occur here in the parameters that
are being ignored.
Using an upper linear fractional transform the system can be written asα˙
Q˙
 =
−LαmV¯ 1−LQmV¯0
Mα0
Iyy
MQ0
Iyy
α
Q
+
 0 0 0
Mα0
Iyy
MQ0
Iyy
MδE0
Iyy
w +
 0
MδE0
Iyy
 δE (7.3.39)
z =

1 0
0 1
0 0

α
Q
+

0
0
1
 δE (7.3.40)
CW =
[
−Lα
m
0
] α
Q
 (7.3.41)
with,
w =

θMα 0 0
0 θMQ 0
0 0 θMδE
 z (7.3.42)
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7.3.3.4 The Disturbance Model
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. In this example the following
properties will be assumed:
• Zero mean white process noise which enters the system in the same
manner as the control input
• Bandwidth limited zero mean white measurement noise
• The error signal is equal to the plant output
Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model:
α˙
Q˙
x˙n
 =

−Lα
mV¯
1−LQ
mV¯0
0
Mα0
Iyy
MQ0
Iyy
0
0 0 c


α
Q
xn
+

0 0 0
Mα0
Iyy
MQ0
Iyy
MδE0
Iyy
0 0 0
w
+

0
MδE0
Iyy
0
 δE +

0
kP
−c
 d (7.3.43)
z =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0


α
Q
xn
+

0
0
1
 δE (7.3.44)
CW =
[
−Lα
m
0 km
] 
α
Q
xn
 (7.3.45)
e =
[
−Lα
m
0 km
] 
α
Q
xn
 (7.3.46)
The values for the model parameters are provided in Appendix A.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION FOR A SMALL UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLE 111
10−4
10−2
100
102
10−4
10−2
100
102
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
Estimator Bandwidth (rad.s−1)Excitation Frequency (rad.s−1)
G
ai
n 
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (d
B)
Figure 7.15: Normal Acceleration AFD performance as a function of estimator
bandwidth as well as excitation frequency. As before, the optimisation is
performed for a targeted detection time of 1s.
7.3.3.5 Solution Synthesis and Results
Suppose that the UAV suffers damage to its tail section, resulting in the fol-
lowing fault case:
Θ =

−0.1 0 0
0 −0.2 0
0 0 −0.3
 (7.3.47)
Therefore, the damage results in a 10% reduction in the pitching moment due
to angle of attack, a 20% reduction in pitch damping, and a 30% reduction in
pitch control authority.
It is considered acceptable to penalise fault detection times of below one
second. Therefore, the targeted detection time as chosen as
td = 1s (7.3.48)
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Figure 7.16: Normal Acceleration AFD performance as a function of estimator
bandwidth for a targeted detection time of 1s.
Furthermore, the following noise model parameters are used,
c = −10000 km = 0.01 kp = 0.1 (7.3.49)
Using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot can be easily
produced showing the AFD performance as a function of the estimator band-
width and auxiliary excitation frequency. The results are shown in figure 7.15.
Alternatively, the optimal solution can be represented using separate estima-
tor bandwidth and auxiliary excitation frequency related plots. The results
are shown in Figure 7.16 and 7.17.
From these figures or using the solution method shown in Figure 5.3 it is
possible to determine the optimal estimator bandwidth and gain as
ωLopt = 0.7197 rad.s−1 Lopt =
[
−0.0513 −0.5272 0
]T
(7.3.50)
and the optimal excitation frequency as
ωηopt = 1.6882 rad.s−1 (7.3.51)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION FOR A SMALL UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLE 113
10−2 10−1 100 101 102
−80
−70
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
G
ai
n 
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (d
B)
 
Excitation Frequency (rad.s−1)  (rad/s)
Figure 7.17: Normal Acceleration AFD performance as a function of excitation
frequency for a targeted detection time of 1s and at the optimal estimator
bandwidth.
7.4 Full Lateral Acceleration-Roll Dynamics
AFD
In this section, active fault detection is applied to the full lateral acceleration
and roll aircraft dynamics model. This model is based on the research pre-
sented in [18] and [22]. These models are further refined by considering each
control surface independently as defined in subsection 7.2.2, thereby enabling
improved actuator cancellation.
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7.4.1 Full Lateral Acceleration-Roll Dynamics
The full lateral acceleration dynamics are given by the following state space
representation [22].

β˙
R˙
P˙
 =

Yβ
mV¯0
−1 YP
mV¯0
N¯β
Izz
N¯R
Izz
N¯P
Izz
L¯β
Ixx
L¯R
Ixx
L¯P
Ixx


β
R
P
+

YδRl
mV¯0
YδRr
mV¯0
YδAl
mV¯0
YδAr
mV¯0¯NδRl
Izz
¯NδRr
Izz
¯NδAl
Izz
¯NδAr
Izz
L¯δRl
Ixx
L¯δRr
Ixx
L¯δEl
Ixx
L¯δEr
Ixx


δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.1)
BW =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
YP
m
] 
β
R
P
+
[
YδRl
m
YδRr
m
YδAl
m
YδAr
m
]

δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.2)
7.4.2 Scheme Selection
The full lateral-roll dynamics are given by a proper MIMO system, where Deu
is a matrix of full-row rank. Following the selection process shown in Figure
5.1, the output-cancellation MIMO framework may be selected. This further
implies that the solution will not impose an additional nominal performance
and disturbance penalty. As was stated previously, the worst-case optimisation
will be performed.
7.4.3 The Fault Model
At first glance it would seem that a twenty-one parameter fault model is re-
quired. However, considering that many parameters are physically related
to other parameters, any change in the one parameter will also be visible in
the other parameter. Therefore, consider the following seven parameter fault
model:
N¯β = N¯β0
(
1 + θN¯β
)
N¯R = N¯R0
(
1 + θN¯R
)
¯NδRl = ¯NδRl0
(
1 + θ ¯NδRl
)
¯NδRr = ¯NδRr0
(
1 + θ ¯NδRr
)
L¯P = L¯P0
(
1 + θL¯P
)
L¯δAl = L¯δAl0
(
1 + θL¯δAl
)
L¯δAr = L¯δAr0
(
1 + θL¯δAr
)
(7.4.3)
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where θXY are all zero in the nominal case.
As before this results in optimising for a fault that technically can not
occur. Real faults will however still be detected.
Using an upper linear fractional transform, the system can be written as

β˙
R˙
P˙
 =

Yβ
mV¯0
−1 YP
mV¯0
N¯β
Izz
N¯R
Izz
N¯P
Izz
L¯β
Ixx
L¯R
Ixx
L¯P
Ixx


β
R
P
+

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N¯β0
Izz
N¯R0
Izz
N¯δRl0
Izz
N¯δRr0
Izz
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 L¯P0
Ixx
L¯δAl0
Ixx
L¯δAr0
Ixx
w
+

YδRl
mV¯0
YδRr
mV¯0
YδAl
mV¯0
YδAr
mV¯0¯NδRl
Izz
¯NδRr
Izz
¯NδAl
Izz
¯NδAr
Izz
L¯δRl
Ixx
L¯δRr
Ixx
L¯δEl
Ixx
L¯δEr
Ixx


δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.4)
z =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0


β
R
P
+

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.5)
BW =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
YP
m
] 
β
R
P
+
[
YδRl
m
YδRr
m
YδAl
m
YδAr
m
]

δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.6)
with
w =

θN¯β 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 θN¯R 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 θN¯δRl 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 θN¯δRr 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 θL¯P 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 θL¯δAl 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 θL¯δAr

z (7.4.7)
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7.4.4 The Disturbance Model
Next, the disturbance model is introduced. In this example the following
properties will be assumed:
• Zero mean white process noise which enters the system in the same
manner as the control input
• Bandwidth limited zero mean white measurement noise
• The error signal is equal to the plant output
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Adding the disturbance model results in the following three port model:

β˙
R˙
P˙
x˙n
 =

Yβ
mV¯0
−1 YP
mV¯0
0
N¯β
Izz
N¯R
Izz
N¯P
Izz
0
L¯β
Ixx
L¯R
Ixx
L¯P
Ixx
0
0 0 0 c


β
R
P
xn
+

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N¯β0
Izz
N¯R0
Izz
N¯δRl0
Izz
N¯δRr0
Izz
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 L¯P0
Ixx
L¯δAl0
Ixx
L¯δAr0
Ixx
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

w
+

YδRl
mV¯0
YδRr
mV¯0
YδAl
mV¯0
YδAr
mV¯0¯NδRl
Izz
¯NδRr
Izz
¯NδAl
Izz
¯NδAr
Izz
L¯δRl
Ixx
L¯δRr
Ixx
L¯δEl
Ixx
L¯δEr
Ixx
0 0 0 0


δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
+

0
0
kP
−c
 d (7.4.8)
z =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

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R
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0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.9)
BW =
[
Yβ
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m
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]

β
R
P
xn
+
[
YδRl
m
YδRr
m
YδAl
m
YδAr
m
]

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 (7.4.10)
e =
[
Yβ
m
YR
m
YP
m
km
]

β
R
P
xn
+
[
YδRl
m
YδRr
m
YδAl
m
YδAr
m
]

δRl
δRr
δAl
δAr
 (7.4.11)
The values for the model parameters are provided in Appendix A.
7.4.5 Solution Synthesis and Results
Since the lateral acceleration roll model given is proper with Deu of full-row
rank, equation 3.2.10 applies. Now, given that the error output is equal to the
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system output, the input shaping filter is given by:
x˙η = (A−BuD+euCe)xη +BuaHη0ηh
=

−0.2318 −1.003 0.002654
106.5 −0.7535 −0.6733
14.3 0.5627 −5.968
xη
+

0.07896 0.07896 −0.007165 −0.007165
−4.404 −4.404 0.7341 0.7341
0.2023 0.2023 −16.59 −16.59
 aH0ηh
η = −D+euCexη + IaHη0ηh
=

0.2743 −0.01564 −0.003141
0.2743 −0.01564 −0.003141
−0.6471 0.0369 0.00741
−0.6471 0.0369 0.00741
xη +

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 aH0ηh (7.4.12)
where H0 is a base matrix for the kernel of Deu. Therefore,
H0ηh ∈
[
1.0261 1.2219 0.4764 0.4764
]T
(7.4.13)
From this input shaping filter it can be seen that the actuator mix is substan-
tially improved over the simplified lateral dynamics case. Furthermore, it is
noted that the excitation is not decoupled from the roll moment.
With reference to figures 7.18, 7.19, and 7.20 it can be seen that the aux-
iliary input excites all actuators and system states, but has no meaningful
impact on the system output.
Suppose that the UAV suffers damage to its tail section, resulting in the
following fault case
Θ =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −0.2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −0.1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(7.4.14)
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Figure 7.18: The auxiliary excitation signal. Note that both the ailerons and
rudders are excited.
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Figure 7.19: The output zeroing states. Note that both the yaw rate and
side-slip angle are non-zero.
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Figure 7.20: Although there is a non-zero input and non-zero states, the re-
sulting output is zero.
10−2
100
102
10−2
100
102
−150
−100
−50
0
50
Estimator Bandwidth (rad.s−1)Excitation Frequency (rad.s−1)
G
ai
n 
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (d
B)
Figure 7.21: Lateral Acceleration Roll AFD performance as a function of esti-
mator bandwidth as well as excitation frequency. As before, the optimisation
is performed for a targeted detection time of 1s.
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Figure 7.22: Lateral Acceleration Roll AFD performance as a function of esti-
mator bandwidth for a targeted detection time of 1s.
Therefore, the damage results in a 20% reduction in yaw rate damping and a
10% reduction in the left rudder’s yaw control authority.
It is considered acceptable to penalise fault detection times of below one
second. Therefore, the targeted detection time is chosen as
td = 1s (7.4.15)
Furthermore, the following noise model parameters are used:
c = −10000 km = 0.01 kp = 0.1 (7.4.16)
Using the equations derived in this work, a frequency plot showing the
AFD performance as a function of the estimator bandwidth and auxiliary
excitation frequency can easily be produced. The results are shown in figure
7.21. Alternatively, the optimal solution can be represented using separate
estimator bandwidth and auxiliary excitation frequency related plots. The
results are shown in Figure 7.22 and 7.23.
From these figures or using the solution method shown in Figure 5.3 it is
possible to determine the optimal estimator bandwidth and gain as
ωLopt = 1.4251 rad.s−1 Lopt =
[
0.4711 13.5825 10.8363 0
]T
(7.4.17)
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Figure 7.23: Lateral Acceleration Roll AFD performance as a function of ex-
citation frequency for a targeted detection time of 1s and at the optimal esti-
mator bandwidth.
and, the optimal excitation frequency as
ωηopt = 1.0891 rad.s−1 (7.4.18)
7.5 Simulation
In this section, the Active Fault Detection systems designed in this chapter are
tested by means of simulations. To begin with, the three decoupled simplified
AFD systems are simulated. Next the full combined lateral acceleration and
roll AFD system is simulated and compared with the simplified decoupled
systems.
7.5.1 Simplified Roll AFD System Simulation
From the AFD system developed for the simplified UAV roll model in sub-
section 7.3.1 a simple simulation can be implemented. The auxiliary signal
amplitude is selected such that the additional nominal system disturbance is
limited to ±1 unit on the error output.
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Figure 7.24: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 16 seconds later. Note
that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger
value is set to one for a single sample period.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.24 for moderate levels of
white noise and in Figure 7.25 for high levels of white noise. In these figures
the following is shown: the auxiliary excitation signal; the error output; the
residual output; the detector input; the detector output; and the detector
trigger. Note that the setup proves robust against white noise, while providing
a substantial signal to noise gain from error signal to residual output.
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Figure 7.25: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 150 seconds and is detected 9 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
7.5.2 Simplified Lateral Acceleration AFD System
Simulation
From the AFD system developed for the simplified UAV lateral acceleration
model in subsection 7.3.2, a simple simulation can be implemented. The aux-
iliary signal amplitude is selected such that the additional nominal system
disturbance is limited to ±1 unit on the error output.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.26 for moderate levels of white
noise and in Figure 7.27 for high levels of white noise. In these figures the fol-
lowing is shown: the auxiliary excitation signal; the error output; the residual
output; the detector input; the detector output; and the detector trigger. Note
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Figure 7.26: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 6 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
that the setup proves robust against white noise, while inducing no additional
nominal system disturbance. Furthermore, it is again noted that the excitation
used for this lateral AFD system would not be practical. Ailerons are simply
not effective at producing lateral acceleration, and therefore an unrealistically
large aileron deviation is required in order to cancel the rudders.
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Figure 7.27: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 5 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
7.5.3 Simplified Normal Acceleration AFD System
Simulation
From the AFD system developed for the simplified UAV normal acceleration
model in subsection 7.3.3, a simple simulation can be implemented. The aux-
iliary signal amplitude is selected such that the additional nominal system
disturbance is limited to ±1 unit on the error output.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.28 for moderate levels of
white noise and in Figure 7.29 for high levels of white noise. In these figures
the following is shown: the auxiliary excitation signal; the error output; the
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Figure 7.28: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 16 seconds later. Note
that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger
value is set to one for a single sample period.
residual output; the detector input; the detector output; and the detector
trigger. Note that the setup proves robust against white noise, while providing
a substantial signal to noise gain from error signal to residual output.
7.5.4 Full Lateral-Roll AFD System Simulation
From the AFD system developed for the full UAV lateral acceleration and
roll model in subsection 7.4.1, a simple simulation can be implemented. The
auxiliary signal amplitude is selected such that the additional faulty system
disturbance is limited to ±1 unit on the error output.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 7.30 for moderate levels of
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Figure 7.29: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 11 seconds later. Note
that each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger
value is set to one for a single sample period.
white noise and in Figure 7.31 for high levels of white noise. In these figures
the following is shown: the auxiliary excitation signal; the error output; the
residual output; the detector input; the detector output; and the detector
trigger. Note that the setup proves robust against white noise, while providing
a substantial signal to noise gain from error signal to residual output.
7.6 Summary
When comparing the separate, simplified roll and lateral acceleration model
AFD results to the combined model, the following is noted:
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Figure 7.30: Simulation results with a moderate amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 5 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
• Both approaches result in no additional lateral acceleration being intro-
duced into the system output.
• Both approaches excite all the actuators as well as system states.
• As was expected, the combined model results in far more balanced ac-
tuator excitation.
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Figure 7.31: Simulation results with a large amount of noise in the correct
ratio. Failure occurs at 195 seconds and is detected 4 seconds later. Note that
each time the threshold is reached the detector is reset, and the trigger value
is set to one for a single sample period.
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Conclusion
Optimal open-loop active fault detection for a stable linear time-invariant sys-
tem is considered. This investigation consists of: a brief literature review; the
detailed development of a theoretical AFD optimisation framework; theoret-
ical application of the framework; and the practical application of this AFD
optimisation framework.
8.1 Theoretical Development
The research presented in [69], [71], [54] and [55] is simplified by considering
the AFD problem in the open-loop case. The design of the estimator is con-
sidered an integral part of the AFD optimisation process instead of being a
fixed controller attribute. It is therefore suggested that a separate estimator
should be used for optimal state estimation, if desired. Equations are derived
to minimise the noise covariance on the nominal residual output as well as to
maximise the Dual Youla parameter. The framework allows the AFD opti-
misation to be performed for either the average- or worst-case scenario. This
approach results in a novel, yet simple to apply AFD architecture.
The implications of applying the open-loop framework to stable closed-loop
systems is considered and analysed. It is found that the open-loop framework
can by applied to closed-loop systems, and that the performance improvement
or degradation is quantifiable.
In order to realise a non-trivial solution, the open-loop theory is extended
in a novel way to include dynamical effects of the detector. It is found that this
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effect can be closely approximated by a second order transfer function, with
a low-pass cut-off frequency determined by the minimum targeted detection
time.
In an effort to decrease the complexity of applying the optimisation frame-
work to the general MIMO case, an novel LTI pre-shaping filter is added. This
filter incorporates the majority of the added MIMO complexities, thereby leav-
ing the remainder of the system largely identical between MIMO and SISO
applications.
The MIMO theory is further extended to take advantage of certain MIMO
system null space properties. These system properties are used to arrive at
two AFD solutions without the nominal performance penalty integral to the
SISO theory. The simpler approach is applicable to systems with redundant
actuators cancelling the injected disturbance at the input matrix. Alterna-
tively, methods developed to solve the general output zeroing problem [73] are
used to design a pre-shaping filter complying with the conditions stipulated in
[73].
Finally, the theoretical framework is applied to a number of simple illus-
trative examples. These examples are designed in order to demonstrate the
key AFD problem elements.
8.2 Practical Applicability
The application of active fault tolerant control to aerospace applications is
discussed, and a conceptual AFTC system is designed. It is shown that such
an ATFC system can be constructed from relatively simple sub-systems. The
purpose of the various sub-systems including the fault detection system is
discussed.
The theoretical AFD optimisation framework is applied to a small un-
manned aerial vehicle. The AFD framework is first applied to simplified de-
coupled dynamical models. It is shown that the application is relatively simple,
while providing rapid fault detection even in the presence of high levels of white
noise. It is however noted that the relative actuator mix might prove prob-
lematic for the simplified lateral-acceleration case. It is finally shown that by
combining the lateral-acceleration with the roll dynamics and considering all
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the control surfaces independently, the rudder-aileron actuator mix problem
can be adequately addressed.
8.3 Comparison to Industry Standard
Methods
When comparing the method developed in this research to the commonly used
multiple-model fault detection method, a number of important advantages are
identified. In the multiple-model method a bank of Kalman filters is usually
employed. Each one of these Kalman filters is then designed to match a postu-
lated failure case. If a large number of non-nominal models need to be detected,
this method can quickly result in a large computational load. Additionally it
is difficult to envisage all possible failure cases. The method proposed here re-
quires only a single estimator per fault class which must be optimised for. Non
time-critical faults are still detected even if they were not explicitly optimised
for. Detection in such cases merely occurs in a sub-optimal manner.
One major disadvantage to consider is that when a fault is detected by a
multiple-model setup, the properties of the new model are immediately known.
With the method presented here, system identification will need to be per-
formed as a separate step. In a computationally constrained environment this
might not be a compromise worth making.
8.4 Future Research Opportunities
The following possible future research opportunities are envisaged:
• A simplification is made by considering the system in the open-loop case.
Closing a control loop around the system alters AFD performance due
to the controller’s disturbance rejection. Although this effect has been
considered in the research presented here, future research should focus
on explicitly deriving the optimised active fault detection framework for
closed-loop systems.
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• A major challenge with effective fault detection arises with compensat-
ing for model uncertainties without adversely effecting detection perfor-
mance. The integration of an adaptive detector is therefore a possible
extension to the framework presented here. This may include an adaptive
estimator as well as adaptive excitation frequency and/or magnitude.
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Appendix A
Meraka Modular UAV
Parameters
A.1 Engine Specifications
Parameter Value
Engine Lag 0.4
Maximum Thrust 150
Minimum Thrust 0
Dynamic Thrust Multiplier 0.75
Table A.1: Meraka Engine Parameters
A.2 Physical Specifications
A.3 Aerodynamic Specifications
A.4 Converting Between Independent and
Classic Control Derivatives
The control derivatives used in some of the research presented here, do not
rely on the classic actuator definitions. Therefore, a few simple equations are
needed in order to calculate the required control derivatives as a function of
137
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Parameter Value
Mass 26.0
Wing Span 4.0
Mean Aerodynamic Chord 0.36
Wing Reference Area 1.44
Wing Aspect Ratio 11.11
Wing Efficiency Factor 0.85
Moment of Inertia about x-axis 16.53436
Moment of Inertia about y-axis 11.58287
Moment of Inertia about z-axis 13.67195
Table A.2: Meraka Physical Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
CD0 0.06 CL0 0.5
CLα 5.557928 CLq 8.046991
CYβ -0.389444 CYp 0.049295
CYr 0.244026 CM0 -0.05
CMα -1.069455 CMq -18.442581
Clβ -0.071508 Clp -0.621899
Clr 0.194571 Cnβ 0.102214
Cnp -0.063578 Cnr -0.085316
Table A.3: Modular UAV Stability Derivatives
Actuator CLδx CYδx Clδx CMδx CNδx
Left Aileron -0.47515 -0.009786 -0.16364 0.062452 0.0057296
Right Aileron 0.47515 -0.009786 -0.16364 -0.062452 0.0057296
Left Flap 0.59232 -0.010199 0.11539 -0.065031 0.003495
Right Flap 0.59232 0.010199 -0.11539 -0.065031 -0.003495
Left Elevator 0.17624 -0.028361 0.0072193 -0.6157 0.0092819
Right Elevator 0.17624 0.028361 -0.0072193 -0.6157 -0.0092819
Left Rudder -0.03856 0.10766 0.0029221 0.13189 -0.035695
Right Rudder 0.03856 0.10766 0.0029221 -0.13189 -0.035695
Table A.4: Modular UAV Control Derivatives
the classic control derivatives. These equations are now presented for each of
the actuator pairs.
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A.4.1 Aileron Related Derivatives
The left and right aileron roll control derivatives are related to the classic
aileron roll control derivative by
ClδAl
= 12ClδA (A.4.1)
ClδAr
= 12ClδA (A.4.2)
A.4.2 Flap Related Derivatives
The left and right flap roll control derivatives are related to the classic flap lift
control derivative through
ClδFl
= |yF |2b CLδF (A.4.3)
ClδFr
= −|yF |2b CLδF (A.4.4)
where |yF | is the distance from the flap’s centre of pressure to the roll axis.
A.4.3 Elevator Related Derivatives
The left and right elevator roll control derivatives are related to the classic
elevator lift control derivative through
ClδEl
= |yE|2b CLδE (A.4.5)
ClδEr
= −|yE|2b CLδE (A.4.6)
where |yE| is the distance from the elevator’s centre of pressure to the roll axis.
A.4.4 Rudder Related Derivatives
The left and right rudder roll control derivatives are related to the classic
rudder roll control derivative by
ClδRl
= 12ClδR (A.4.7)
ClδRr
= 12ClδR (A.4.8)
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